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ABSTRACT
TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
SAYGIN, BARIŞ
M. A. in International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ömer İlhan Akipek 
September 1999, 90 pages
In this study Turkey’s policy in terms of international civil aviation is 
reviewed parallel with the major developments in that field. Within this scope 
necessary principles, concepts, aspects and developments in international civil 
aviation are set forth to explain the policy of Turkey in a more apparent way. 
Furthermore particular international treaties are examined to identify the general 
Turkish stance in terms of that issue.
As a conclusion two different policies followed by Turkey are reached. One 
of them is isolationism and the other is active involvement in international civil 
aviation which still continues today.
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’NİN ULUSLARARASI SİVİL HAVACILIĞA YÖNELİK
POLİTİKASI
SAYGIN, BARIŞ
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ömer İlhan Akipek 
Eylül 1999, 90 sayfa
Bu çalışmada Türkiye’nin uluslararası sivil havacılığa yönelik politikası bu 
alandaki temel gelişmeler ve kilometretaşları ile paralel olarak incelenmiştir. Bu 
kapsamda uluslararası sivil havacılıktaki gerekli kurallar, kavramlar ve gelişmeler 
Türkiye’nin politikasını daha açık bir şekilde anlatmak için gerekli yerlerde ortaya 
konulmuştur. Ayrıca belirli uluslararası anlaşmalar Türkiye’nin konuya genel 
bakışını tanımlamak için incelenmeye gerekli görülmüştür.
Sonuç olarak Türkiye tarafından takip edilen iki farklı politika ortaya 
çıkmıştır. Bunlardan ilki izolasyon veya infiratçılık politikası, diğeri ise aktif katılım 
politikasıdır. Türkiye’nin uluslararası sivil havacılıkta aktif olarak yer alması 
anlamına gelen bu politika halen günümüzde de devam etmektedir.
m
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to review Turkey’s policy regarding international 
civil aviation. This is handled together with the development of that concept 
throughout the world. The following four chapters will include concepts and 
definitions, then growth and regulation of civil aviation worldwide in the light of 
international developments and together with these policies made by Turkey 
throughout this process with the factors having impact on them and general aspects 
of those policies.
To comment on any country’s attitude concerning international civil aviation 
first this concept, other related concepts and definitions have to be made clear. By 
this way the reason of the policies made up by that state related with international 
civil aviation could be understood. Therefore mainly the nature of the concept has to 
be put forward in an apparent way.
In this regard as its name implies international civil aviation refers to aviation 
issues out of the military field and it has two main aspects; international air 
transportation which is the economic aspect and international air navigation which is 
the technical aspect. While air transport includes an economic dimension such as the 
carriage of passengers or cargo from one point to the other with a certain charge, air 
navigation is the traffic in airspace coming out from transport activities or any other
flight of a civil aircraft. Thus the two aspects are in fact closely related with each 
other and they together form the framework of international civil aviation in general.^
As to its evolution and development, international aviation is a 20^ ’^ century 
phenomenon related with technological innovations. It became a matter of policy for 
states as it gradually affected their economic or political situation. In other words, as 
civil aviation continued to grow and became a separate subject of interest throughout 
the world there appeared a necessity for states to deal with it by designing various 
different policies. For instance, after the Second World War while the United States 
was in an attitude to liberalise fiilly international air transportation, Britain insisted 
on keeping strict limits and a general regulation. These were both reflected in the
Chiciigo Convention in 19*14 that set forth the main principles in terms o f
international civil aviation. Such a difference o f views regarding the two states was 
a result of the significant point which air transportation had reached at the end of the 
war.
Regarding the international legal documents dealing with the issue 
international civil aviation can be divided into two periods; before the Chicago 
Convention and after the Chicago Convention. The reason is that the Convention set 
forth principles and regulations concerning civil aviation in the world which have 
been accepted and applied all through the subsequent years and today. Therefore the 
Convention is accepted as a milestone. In this respect, there is a particular 
recognition that the general outcome of the Chicago Convention was the 
establishment of an international regime on air transport and traffic. As a definition, 
international regimes are social institutions composed of agreed upon principles, 
norms, rules and procedures that govern the interactions of the actors in specific
• Tissue areas. They cover a wide spectmm in terms of functional scope, geographical 
domain and membership.Their geographical area may be far-flung as that of the 
global regime for international air transport which is considered in this study. This 
regime is also an example of the fact that most regimes deal with a limited set of 
well-defined activities.^
As civil aviation was developing there also became a necessity to deal with 
its technical aspect as well as air transportation. To provide safety and a particular 
order in air navigation a number of international documents were concluded, the first 
of which was the Warsaw Convention.^ Thus as it continued to grow civil aviation 
was dealt with in international relations in both its economic and technical aspects.
On the other hand, to explain these two aspects which together form 
international civil aviation, a legal point of view should also be taken into account. 
This point is the legal status of airspace in which international transportation and 
traffic take place. The legal status of airspace which will be the subject of the next 
chapter includes two different views; the one accepting the freedom of airspace and 
the other claiming that airspace is subject to the sovereignty of states and is one of 
the territorial dimensions of states.^
It is necessary to focus on airspace from the legal point because the 
realisation of international civil aviation has directly affected by the legal 
arrangements concerning airspace accordingly. Almost all international air 
documents have been based on the legal status of airspace. For instance, the Paris 
Convention of 1919 the first legal instrument to enter into force in air law, had 
recognised complete and exclusive sovereignty of states over the airspace above their 
territories.®’  ^ This meant that performing air transport or navigation was totally
subject to the consent of a state to grant permission or not. That principle was also 
maintained in the subsequent Chicago Convention of 1944, however, this time 
mainly five freedoms of air were put forward for the establishment of air services 
again. In short, international civil aviation evolved and continued to develop under 
the influence of mainly two approaches; freedom of airspace and so air transport and 
traffic or complete state sovereignty in airspace.
As regards Turkey in the course of the development of international civil 
aviation, Turkey’s related policy followed two different paths in two different 
periods of time. Before the Chicago Convention, Turkey had been in a state of 
apathy or isolationism towards the functioning of international aviation. This result 
can be drawn from particular forms of attitude of Turkey during that era such as 
staying outside international treaties, organisations and activities related with 
aviation.
However, this policy was replaced by an exactly opposite one which can be 
labelled as active involvement in international civil aviation starting with Turkey’s 
participation in the Chicago Conference in 1944. The new policy has continued 
throughout the second half of the 20*^ ’ century and is still the existing policy of 
Turkey. In other words it can be concluded that the Chicago Convention which is 
accepted as a turning point in the course of international civil aviation is also a 
landmark in the history of Turkey’s policy related with aviation throughout the 
world.
The purpose of this study is to overview Turkey's policy parallel with the 
development of international civil aviation throughout the world. Therefore a certain 
general information is tried to be given initially. Thus the next chapter will explain
the legal status of airspace by putting emphasis on freedom of airspace and 
sovereignty in airspace. The third chapter will review Turkey’s isolationism in terms 
of international civil aviation before the Chicago Convention together with the 
factors giving way to such a policy such as the Treaty of Sevres, and the Lausanne 
and Montreux Conventions. In addition the visible forms of such an isolationism 
such as staying outside particular international treaties, organisations and studies and 
also the implications and evident results of that policy are analyzed in the chapter. 
The fourth chapter will start by explaining Chicago Convention being the 
cornerstone and Turkey in relation with this Convention. Then the bilateral 
agreement of Bermuda that became a model for all the subsequent bilateral 
agreements between states to establish international air services will be overviewed 
and followed by the bilateral air agreements of Turkey. The chapter will continue 
with other multilateral treaties to which Turkey is a party including the Warsaw 
Convention and the Multilateral Paris Agreement of 1956 and the international 
organizations concerned with air traffic and transport of which Turkey is a member, 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the European Civil Aviation 
Conference (ECAC), Eurocontrol, and the International Air Traffic Association 
(lATA). In this regard this chapter will indicate the active involvement policy of 
Turkey in terms of international civil aviation with its various aspects.
Finally the fifth and the conclusion chapter will shortly ^epict the current 
situation of Turkey regarding international air transport and traffÍ9 ^nd try to explain 
the establishment of the regime on international aviation in terms of the theoretical 
framework of international relations.
CHAPTER 2
AVIATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD:
THE LEGAL STATUS OF AIRSPACE
To elaborate fully on the subject of air trafFic and air transportation it is 
originally necessary to evaluate airspace from the legal point of view. The subject of 
air transportation and traffic is directly affected by the decisions taken regarding the 
legal status of the air. For instance, in complete freedom states and their nationals for 
transportation, navigation and other purposes could use airspace. On the contrary, in 
a particular state sovereignty that transportation could be limited. Therefore issues 
concerning air transportation and traffic in one area or as a whole may be dealt with 
in terms of legal status of airspace in that area or in the whole international system. 
The behaviour or the policies of the states on transportation are all extensions of their 
acceptance of airspace either free or being subject to state sovereignty or both with 
some limitations or exceptions. In other words the legal status of airspace lies in the 
roots of air transportation and traffic issues directly or indirectly.
2.1. Freedom of Airspace
There are two major trends concerning the legal status of airspace. The first is 
the one advocating freedom of airspace as it is on high seas.' * Whether it would be 
absolute or limited airspace should have a freedom that states will perform all kinds
of aviation activity such as transportation, navigation, communication or others. This 
freedom is valid both in peace and wartime. This means that it can serve as a 
peaceful area and also as a battlefront for states at different times. This perspective 
supports the absence of state sovereignty in the air and takes airspace as belonging to 
every party being “Res Communis” in legal terms.
In absolute freedom or absence of state sovereignty, all kinds of airflights, 
transportation, battle or aggression would be achieved by states and their nationals. 
The supporting point for this view was that the development of aviation should not 
be hindered. Military or aggressive activities had been somewhat underestimated 
because those were the beginning years of the 20‘'' century. Aviation was in the 
evolutionary phase. The significant point was to provide the growth of aviation as 
stated by Ernest Nys that law should not be an obstacle and formality against science 
and industry.
There was also a place for the freedom of airspace in positive international 
law. That is the principle of freedom was reflected in a number of international 
conventions. Being accepted as the first international document defending the 
freedom of airspace the Franco-German Convention had been signed in July 26, 
1913. This was an agreement between France and Germany based on the concept of 
reciprocity on the rules to be applied for the aircraft of the two states. Military 
aircraft of those states would fly over the territory of each other only if they would be 
permitted and civil aircraft would fly freely except over forbidden zones. In this 
regard this was rather a limited freedom to protect the right of self-defence of those 
states. However it was the freedom trend which was accepted by them.
A concept of freedom had also been included in the Peace Treaty of 
Versailles in June 28, 1919 signed between Germany and Allied Powers of the First 
World War despite the fact that it was an effort to restrict the sovereignty of 
Germany in the airspace over its territory. According to its provisions aircraft of 
Allied Powers would freely fly over and land off the German soil and territorial 
waters. German airports would also be open to aircraft of Allied Powers. As it was 
stipulated in those provisions, freedom belonged only to thej Allied states of the First 
World War and in fact the Treaty was a means of sanction against Germany. 
Nevertheless, there had been a mention of the freedom principle.
Similar to the Treaty of Versailles, the Peace Treaty of Sèvres also had 
articles concerning freedom of flight. The difference was that the latter could not be 
implemented as a whole. In fact it was to restrict the air sovereignty of the Ottoman 
State. In this regard the intention was not to establish a freedom of airspace. At first 
sight there had seemed a number of provisions which were likely to recognise 
airspace as free. However they were to deny the Ottoman air sovereignty.
It became a cornerstone that related with this fact the most significant 
implication of the Treaty of Sevres reflected itself as the starting of the general 
Turkish stance towards international aviation in the first half of the 20**' century. This 
attitude could be called as a kind of isolationism, lack of interest or apathy against 
international aviation m atters.A lthough the frustration for Turkey in terms of 
sovereignty caused by this treaty was going to be counterbalanced in the Lausanne 
and Montreaux Conventions in the forthcoming years, that state of lack of concern 
continued until the time of Chicago Convention in 1944.
2.2. Sovereignty in the Airspace
The second trend accepts state sovereignty over the airspace above the 
territory of that s t a te .As  in the freedom trend this may be absolute or limited. On 
the other hand while there is a two-dimensional territory concept in the freedom, the 
sovereignty trend foresees a three-dimensional territory including the airspace over 
the land and territorial waters of the state.
It is the sovereignty view that has been accepted by the majority of states and 
international conventions throughout time rather than freedom.
Absolute sovereignty can be concerned both in terms of height or nature. As 
to height there is no limitation to the sovereignty of that state within atmosphere 
other than atmosphere’s upper end. Thus together with waters and land the state can 
have a three-dimensional territory.
In terms of its nature the sovereignty of a state over its airspace means that it 
is not limited by any legal rule to this end. As a result it remains totally to that state 
whether to allow aircrafts of other states to enter into its airspace or to withdraw such 
kind of rights.
As in terms of absolute sovereignty limited sovereignty can also be according 
to height or nature . As to height supporters of this view argue that sovereignty of a 
state can be limited by a predetermined definite height such as the range of a canon 
or the Earth’s highest point and an additional one hundred meters.
On the other hand, the height can also be variable according to different 
conditions such as a height up to which a state can defend itself This means that a 
state can have sovereignty in the airspace over its territory as long as it is fully able
to insert this sovereignty or it can be sovereign in parts of that airspace where it can 
fully apply this.
State sovereignty over the territorial airspace is the basic principle underlying 
the whole system of international air law. The current air law theory is based on the 
concept of air sovereignty as an extension of states’ territorial sovereignty. Thus 
airspace is recognised as a natural continuation of the land and maritime territory or 
its complementary part.
This acceptance was not a mere result of theoretical concepts. Rather the 
theory emerged as a result of states’ practices throughout history. Yet the 
significance and legal consequences of this became apparent after the age of flight 
had begun.
At the beginning of the 20**' century the threats that airspace might cause to 
national security and public order became clear. Thus the fact that the majority of 
states have been more in favour of state sovereignty in the airspace was also directly 
reflected in a number of international agreements such as The Paris Convention of 
1919. By the outbreak of the First World War the principle of sovereignty in the 
useable space over national land and waters had been accepted by the international 
community as a customary rule. No state questioned the right of each to control at its 
discretipq flight over its surface territories and to prohibit the entry into its 
useable airspace of any foreign aircraft.
So the preparation and signing of the Paris Convention of 1919 
acknowledged and restated this already existing customary international law rule. 
The Convention recognised that each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty in 
the airspace over its territory including its territorial seas. The only limitation put
10
forward to that sovereignty was the right of innocent passage for the aircraft of other 
contracting states.
The Paris Convention was accepted as the first legal instrument to enter into 
force in air law. It was followed by the Ibero-American Convention of 1926 
including several Latin American states,'^ the Pan-American (Havana) Convention 
of 1928 and finally the Chicago Convention of 1944 where the principle of 
sovereignty and its only limitation of innocent passage in the Paris Convention have 
been reproduced.
The Chicago Convention of 1944 incorporated all those former conventions 
and became the only relevant document in the field. Although the complete and 
exclusive sovereignty was accepted in fact it could not be understood as absolute. 
Thus the rights deriving from sovereignty, even if exclusive, were also subject to 
limitations. Thus the fundamental sovereignty principle was sanctioned in the 
Chicago Convention. The possibility of allowing greater freedom of movement was 
made explicit in two agreements annexed to the Convention and called as “freedoms 
of air”, “air traffic rights” or “air privileges” which would be given in various 
different forms such as a multilateral or bilateral international agreement or by a 
unilateral act of the state.
The Chicago Convention at the same time was the most widely accepted 
international document on aviation. By including Turkey it also became a landmark 
in Turkey’s civil air policy similar to the kind of effect caused by the Treaty of 
Sevres. While the Treaty of Sevres had started the first era of Turkish policy on 
international aviation, the Chicago Convention also opened a new stage in 1944 for
11
Turkey by closing the isolationist era and starting the policy of active involvement in 
international civil aviation.
12
CHAPTER 3
TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL AVIATION IN THE 
FIRST HALF OF THE 20**· CENTURY 
(BEFORE THE CHICAGO CONVENTION): 
ISOLATIONISM
As a whole the Treaty of Sèvres which could be given as an example in 
evaluating the principle of freedom of airspace for the pronounciation of its articles 
was the starting point for isolationist attitude of Turkey against international aviation. 
At this stage, it is worth mentioning the general Turkish attitude before the Chicago 
Convention by giving priority to the Treaty of Sevres, the Lausanne Convention and 
the Montreux Convention.
3.1. Treaty of Sèvres
Although it was not accepted by Turkey the Treaty of Sèvres created a 
particular degree of disappointment and frustration in respect of air policy as well as 
in all other aspects. During the first two decades of the 20*^ ' century there had existed 
at least some motivation for aviation in Turkey. For instance, in April 11,1912 the 
first Turkish aeroplane took off from Yeçilkôy-Istanbul. In addition a number of 
young Ottoman army officers had been sent to Western European countries to study
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and become aware of aviation techniques.^^ However such efforts were overcome by 
the counter-effect coming from the Sèvres Treaty of August 10,1920.
As with its other provisions, those concerning with air were also too much 
harsh for the Ottoman State. For instance, in Section III under the heading of “Air 
Clauses” according to Article 191:
“The Turkish armed forces must not include any military or naval air 
forces. ”
Some other articles in that section were also explicitly indicating the nature of 
the treaty:
Article 192: “Within two months from the coming into force o f 
the present Treaty the personnel o f the air forces on the rolls o f 
the Turkish land and sea forces shall be demobilised. ’’
Article 193: “Until the complete evacuation o f Turkish territory 
by the Allied troops, the aircrafts o f the Allied Powers shall 
have throughout Turkish territory freedom o f passage through 
the air, freedom o f transi t and o f landing. ”
In Section IV of the Treaty Commissions of Control were established to deal 
with the recording of aviation equipment and to inspect mainly hangars, aeroplane 
and balloon factories and explosive materials used in aeroplanes of the Ottoman 
State.
On the other hand Part X of the Treaty specifically concerned with air-traffic 
on the Turkish territory under the heading of “Aerial Navigation”. The main articles 
to this end were the following:
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Article 318: “The aircraft o f the Allied Powers shall have fu ll 
liberty o f passage and landing over and in the territory and 
territorial waters o f Turkey, and shall enjoy the same privileges 
as Turkish aircraft, particularly in case o f distress by land or 
sea”
Article 319: “The aircraft o f the Allied Powers shall, while in 
transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right offlying 
over the territory and territorial waters o f Turkey without 
landing, subject always to any regulations which may be made 
by Turkey with the assent o f the Principal Allied Powers, and 
which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft o f Turkey and 
those o f the Allied countries. ”
In the same part the right of cabotage that means the right of a state to carry 
on air or maritime traffic between different points within her borders was handled in 
terms of the Turkish state in Article 323:
“As regards international commercial air traffic the aircraft o f 
the Allied Powers shall enjoy in Turkey most-favoured-nation 
treatment. "
Thus it was clearly indicated in this Article that there would not even exist a 
single right of cabotage for the Turkish State.
In short the Treaty of Sèvres meant in a way the termination of the newly 
born Turkish aviation. The Ottoman State from now on would no longer possess any 
aircraft or a particular airforce. The existing airforce and related equipment would be 
all handed over to the Allied Powers. Those powers by means of Aeronautical
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Commission of Control would inspect and dominate all air facilities. Their aircraft 
would perform any fly-over and landing regarding every part of the Turkish territory. 
Thus the Turkish airspace would be completely open and free for foreign aircraft. 
Also the carriage of passengers, cargo and mail inside the Turkish territory would be 
made by those powers. Therefore this was the absence of the right of cabotage for 
Turkey because she would not promulgate or put into force any laws or regulations 
related with those matters.
In general all those provisions of the Treaty were in fact means of destroying 
the Turkish air sovereignty as well as land and sea. Therefore it was the imposition 
and the following effect of the Treaty of Sèvres which broke down all the existing 
motivation and plans on aviation in Turkey at that time and paved the way for a 
precautionary, suspicious and closed air policy almost during the first half of the 20*^ ' 
century.
This policy did not change in the afterwards of the Lausanne and Montreux 
Conventions. In those two conventions Turkey all took place in an effort to take her 
air sovereignty back and to defend it to the most possible extent.
3.2. Lausanne Convention
Turkey regained independence in terms of airspace above her territory back at 
the Lausanne Convention dated July 24,1923 as well as in all other aspects. Despite 
the fact that the Allied Powers imposed principle of freedom of airspace above the 
Straits in order not to leave those areas under the absolute and exclusive control of 
Turkey the regime accepted in the Convention dissolved the subordinate position of
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the country in international forum which had previously been established at the 
Treaty of Sèvres. In this regard military and civil aviation returned to the country’s 
sovereign will to a considerable extent. Turkey on her own demand engaged in 
certain undertakings on aviation. These were all reflected in the Convention.
Mainly there were two major points about Turkey in terms of aviation and 
international air law in the Lausanne Convention:
I ) Turkey’s Position In The Face of Paris Convention Dated October 13, 1919 
Regulating Aerial Navigation:
According to Article 100 of the Lausanne Convention Turkey would 
participate in the Paris Convention of 1919. In the Article it was written that:
"Turkey undertakes to adhere to the Convention o f October 
13,1919, regulating aerial navigation, provided that Turkey 
obtains, under the Protocol o f May 1,1920, such derogations as 
her geographic situation may render necessary. ”
This Protocol had been put forward as a countermeasure against one 
shortcoming of the Paris Convention. According to Article 5 of that Convention 
unless there existed a special and temporary permission no signatory state would 
accept any aircraft of another state which was not a party to the Convention to fly 
over its territory. Therefore airspace of the contracting parties would be closed for 
non-signatory states except special circumstances.
At this point it was the objection of Switzerland that was raised against this 
statement in the Paris Convention.^^ Because in the light of Article 5 Switzerland 
might only accept aircrafts of the signatory states to pass over her territory. In such a 
case aircrafts of Germany or Austria that were not parties to the Convention could
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not be permitted to fly over Switzerland. Against this situation Germany or Austria 
might also not permit Switzerland to direct her aircrafts for passing over their 
territories.
Hence in a case of a planned scheduled air service between Warsaw and 
Zurich, Swiss aeroplanes would have been obliged to choose an alternative route 
unfortunately being less appropriate to reach Warsaw in stead of doing this by 
passing through Germany or Austria which would overall create a considerable 
disadvantage for Switzerland. Thus the Protocol of May 1,1920 had been included in 
the Paris Convention as a result of Switzerland’s dilemma and her subsequent 
objection.
Similar to the situation of Switzerland, Turkey would be in a disadvantageous 
position if she become a party to the Convention without any objection. Because of 
Article 5, Turkey would undertake the burden of prohibiting non-signatory states’ 
aircraft to fly over and pass through her territory. The problem was that states in the 
neighbourhood of Turkey were almost non-contractor states. Therefore because they 
could not be able to fly over Turkish territory, they might also close their airspace 
against Turkish aircrafts’ flights as a counter measure. So this was a significant 
geographical setback for Turkey.
Hence in Article 100 of the Lausanne Convention Turkey wanted to relate her 
participation in the Paris Convention with the Protocol dated May 1,1920 by putting 
forward her specific geographical situation. Paris Convention could only be adopted 
if an exceptional place was given to Turkey.
18
Eventually Article 100 of the Lausanne Convention stipulated that Turkey 
would become a party to the Paris Convention of 1919 if there would be a regulation 
of the disadvantageous position caused by her geographic location.
Nevertheless despite all those amendments on the Paris Convention Turkey 
never became a participant country.^^
II) Situation o f the Turkish Straits and the Thrace Region:
The Straits:
The concept of freedom which was one of the trends concerning the legal 
status of airspace also found place at the Lausanne Convention in respect of the 
Turkish Straits. '^* It was reflected in the recognised status of airspace and air-traffic 
above those areas.
First, the Straits were declared as demilitarised zones and then freedom of 
traffic in the airspace as well as on the sea thereon came to be negotiated. Freedom 
of air traffic on the Straits was kept alive either in peace and war time when Turkey 
is nonbelligerent. About the freedom of traffic. Article 1 of the Lausanne Convention 
Relating to the Regime of the Straits and Turkey stipulated that:
“The High Contracting Parties agree to recognise and declare 
the principle o f freedom o f transit and o f navigation by sea and 
air in the Strait o f the Dardanelles, the Sea o f Marmara and the 
Bosphorus, hereinafter comprised under the general term o f the 
Straits. ”
The Convention after establishing this general principle in its first article, 
then explained its application process by making a separation between commercial 
and military aircrafts. This was explained in Article 2 and its related Annex having
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the title “Rules for the Passage of Commercial Vessels and Aircraft, and of War 
Vessels and Aircraft thiough the Straits”.
Commercial Aircraft:
*Iii Time of Peace:
For commercial , merchant, and non-military aircraft in time of peace the 
freedom of passage from the Straits was recognised as written fully in the Annex;^ *" 
“Complele freedom o f navigation and passage by day and night 
under any flag  and with any kind o f cargo, without any 
formalities, or tax, or charge whatever (subject, however to 
international sanitary provisions) unless fo r services directly 
rendered, such as pilotage, light, towage or other similar 
charges and without prejudice to the right exercised in this 
respect by the services and undertakings now operating under 
concession granted by the Turkish Government. ”
*ln Time of War Turkey Being Neutral:
The same principle also applied. Thus Turkey would not take any measures 
against the freedom of navigation in the Straits in a war in which she is neutral.
*In Time of War, Turkey Being a Belligerent:
In a war where Turkey is a party however, non-military aircrafts of neutral 
states would freely pass through the Straits only on the condition that they do not 
transport any contraband of war to the enemy side or carry enemy troops or nationals 
as it was written in the Annex;
‘‘Freedom o f navigation fo r neutral vessels and neutral non- 
military aircraft, i f  the vessel or aircraft in question does not
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assist the enemy, particularly by carrying contraband, troops or 
enemy nationals. ”
That condition was somewhat a precautionary measure put for Turkey. To 
strengthen the precautionary measure Turkey at the same time was given the right to 
apply sanctions by making investigations on those aircrafts and therefore they would 
be subject to the control of Turkey and make a landing to any area on the sea or soil 
wherever Turkey finds necessary.
Military Aircraft:
*In Time of Peace:
For military aircrafts and their respective carriers in time of peace the 
freedom of passage was recognised similar to commercial and non-military
aircrafts 27
*In Time of War Turkey Being Neutral:
Turkey would no take any measure against the freedom of air traffic in the 
Straits of which airspace is considered to be completely free. As in commercial 
aircrafts there would be a complete freedom of passage day and night under any flag. 
Flowever those limitations would not be applicable to any belligerent power to the 
prejudice of its belligerent rights in the Black Sea.
On the other hand aircrafts of the parties at war would pass there without 
stopping and avoid engaging in aggressive and hostile movements in those areas as 
written in the Annex:
“Warships and military aircraft o f belligerents will be 
forbidden to make any capture, to exercise the right o f visit and 
search, or to carry out any other hostile act in the Straits. ”
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In principle there would be complete freedom of passage for neutral warships 
without any formalities or tax or charge whatever.
Turkey would have the right to exclude enemy aircrafts from getting use of 
the Straits and to take necessary measures thereof However she would continue to 
provide freedom of passage for the neutral states’ aircrafts.
If the same freedom is applied not only commercial but also to the military 
aircrafts of neutral states those at the same time could be subject to the control and 
inspection of Turkey. Hence they would also be subject to land on the sea or soil in 
particular regions specified by Turkey.
Both civilian and military aircraft would have the right to fly over a strip of 
territory of five kilometres on each side of the narrow parts of the Straits.^^ On the 
other hand Turkey would have a regulatory power and right to restrict the time 
period in which foreign aircrafts will stay on Turkish airports.
Demilitarised Zones in Relation with Aircraft:
In Article 4 of the Convention the Straits were demilitarised and no military 
installation could be placed there any more. Nonetheless in peacetime Turkey could 
monitor the surface and bottom of the sea in those areas by means of aeroplanes or 
balloons. Furthermore Turkish aeroplanes could be able to fly over demilitarised 
zones and waters of the Straits and at war Turkey could have complete freedom in all 
those areas.
2) n te  Thrace Region:
According to Lausanne Convention a thirty kilometers territory on either side 
of the border which separated Turkey from Greece and Bulgaria was completely
*In Time of War, Turkey Being Belligerent:
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demilitarised. Hence forward neither of those three states could include any air 
facility or aircraft on that area.^ ® In addition no military aeroplane having the flag of 
any state could fly over them.
Overall at the end of the Lausanne Convention the Straits became open for 
the ships and aircraft of all states by being identified with the principle of freedom.
3.3. Montreux Convention
As time went by the loop-holes and inefficiencies of the Lausanne Regime 
started to become more evident. The provisions concerning Turkey’s security and 
demilitarised zones appeared as being especially unsatisfactory.
The signing of Lausanne Convention had taken place in a relatively 
optimistic and idealistic environment when states including Turkey in the immediate 
afterwards of a series of disastrous wars had kept in themselves great hopes for peace 
and that another war would not happen in the near future.
However, after about one decade international atmosphere once again began 
to bear tensions and turmoil. Developments happening in Europe around 1930s were 
sort of perilous signals of possibility of another great war.
Realising this worsening picture of world politics Turkey saw the necessity to 
reconsider the Lausanne Regime first at the International Conference of 
Disarmament in 1933. For the reason that the Conference proved unsuccessful and 
failed to achieve a concrete result the idea of Turkey was suspended for a short time. 
Then the matter was handled at the Council of League of Nations’ Eighth Assembly 
in the year of 1935.
2.3
The fragile international atmosphere and awesome developments happening 
in Europe around 1935 and 1936 led Turkey to send a note to the signatories of the 
Lausanne Convention. In this note the necessity for Turkey to amend the Convention 
on the Straits was explained together with strong reasons by Turkey while she was 
also ready to resume the negotiations to take new precautionary measures for the 
maintenance of her security.
The note of Turkey mainly included the following points:
(i) The situation in Europe for the year of 1936 was completely different than 
in 1923.
(ii) The pillars to sustain the Lausanne Regime and the guarantees given to 
Turkey there became somewhat cumbersome and fragile. Rather than the 
machinery of the League of Nations that was functioning too slowly 
Turkey had depended upon the joint movement of Britain, France, Italy 
and Japan. Unfortunately Japan had withdrawn herself from the League of 
Nations in March 27,1933 and the position of Italy was suspicious because 
of her intervention in Abyssinia. Now it was clear that those four states 
could no longer act in common.
(iii) The possibility of an immediate war had not been taken into account in 
Lausanne.
(iv) Turkey holds the right to demand security for her that she provided the 
same for Ofh r^ states.
(v) Eventually reconsider the Lausanne Convention on
the Strait ^
The Note of Turkey dated April 11,1936:
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Those demands of Turkey were accepted by the signatory states of the 
Lausanne Convention and a conference to this end convened in Switzerland at the 
city of Montreux in July 22,1936.
The Status of the Straits Regarding Aviation Recognised in Montreux 
Convention:
The Turkish view at the conference was in the direction of the militarisation 
of the Straits again and the exclusion of civil and military aircraft of foreign powers 
from the region.^*
The Conference ended in July 20.1936 resulting in a convention with a 
protocol signed by the represented states including Turkey.^^ The convention 
consisted of five sections, four annexes and twenty nine articles. The protocol was 
concerned with the renewed militarisation of the Straits. In Article 4 of the Lausanne 
Convention the Straits had been excluded from any military installation. Thus 
Turkey achieved to realise the militarisation of the Straits again in Montreux. 
Together with the protocol this was also implied in Article 23 of that newly reached 
convention.
In the Montreux Convention Article 15 and Article 23 were on aviation.
In Article 15 it was written that:
"Vessels o f war in transit through the Straits shall in, no 
circumstances make use o f any aircraft which they may be 
carrying. ”
This prohibition established by the Article was absolute in peace and wartime 
where Turkey was nonbelligerent. It had no doubt that in a war where Turkey was a
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party, regardless of this prohibition she could be free as to whether or not to permit 
aircrafts to take off from warships in the Straits for her assistance.
The other article on aviation. Article 23 stipulated that:
“In order to assure the passage o f civil aircraft between the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish Government will 
indicate the air routes available fo r this purpose, outside the 
forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits. Civil 
aircraft may use these routes provided that they give the 
Turkish Government, as regards occasional flights, a 
notification o f three days, and as regards flights on regidar 
services, a general notification o f the dates o f passage.
The Turkish Government moreover undertakes, notwithstanding 
any remilitarisation o f the Straits, to furnish the necessary 
facilities fo r the safe passage o f civil aircraft authorised under 
the air regulations in force in Turkey to fly  across Turkish 
territory between Europe and Asia. The route which is to be 
followed in the Straits zone by aircraft which have obtained an 
authorisation shall be indicatedfrom time to time. ”
During the negotiations in Montreux the right of Turkey to regulate air traffic 
above her territory on her own was explicitly revealed and proposed to be written in 
the Convention. However, saying that this can be tacitly understood Turkey did not 
feel any necessity to put this clause in the Convention.^^ Because of the fact that 
Turkey was not a party to the Paris Convention of 1919 which had recognised the
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contracting states the right to regulate air traffic in their airspace, the same right 
could be understood as an absolute one in the context of Montreux Convention.
The passage from the Straits either between Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea 
or between Asia and Europe out of the militarised zones would take place on the 
routes indicated by Turkey and as to circumstances Turkey would make alterations 
on these routes.
Basic DifTerenccs Between Lausanne and Montreux Conventions Concerning 
Airspace:
In Montreux Convention the right of foreign military aircrafts to pass the 
Straits without any permission was abolished. That right had been acquired in 
Lausanne. In peacetime and in a war where Turkey was non-belligerent, Turkey did 
not have the right to interfere in the military aircrafts regarding their passage from 
the Straits.
However in Montreux, Turkey gained the right to regulate aerial navigation 
on the Straits and other parts of her territory either for civil or military aircrafts for 
her own interest. Article 23 of the Convention was only established for civil aircrafts. 
The passage of military aircrafts was left to Turkey’s own consent and recognised 
separate permission.
On the other hand in Article 1 of the Lausanne Convention the principle of 
freedom of aerial navigation and passage had been built either for air and sea. Yet in 
the first article of the Montreaux Convention the principle was restricted merely to 
contain the sea. Freedom of passage in temis of air was excluded.
Another significant and innovative aspect of the new regime founded in 
Montreaux was that in addition to the passage between Mediterranean and Black Sea
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which had been established in Lausanne it also provided for a horizontal passage 
through the Straits between the continents of Asia and Europe which had not existed 
in Lausanne. In this respect, in a way it extended the right of passage for other states 
in the Straits.
Eventually, unlike the Lausanne Regime, the sovereignty of Turkey in the 
airspace above the Straits mainly came back and was explicitly recognised by the 
Montreux Convention. In this regard while the regime established in Lausanne had 
constitute an example of the applieation of freedom concept, the status of the Straits 
and the position of Turkey in Montreaux could be accepted as an illustration of the 
principle that in most of the aviation history states have been more likely to incline 
towards the maintenance of their sovereignty in the airspace above their lands and 
waters. The conclusion of the Convention in Montreux also reflected the cautious, 
protectionist, inner directed and mainly defensive foreign air policy of Turkey 
regarding her airspace at that time.
3.4. Isolationism
The general Turkish air policy before the time of the Chicago Convention 
that approximately lasted for a period of four decades can be labelled as a kind of 
isolationism. Turkey was in an attitude of excluding herself from the whole of the 
matters and developments in the field of international aviation.
The Lausanne Convention ended the suppressive regime caused by the Sèvres 
Treaty and delivered Turkey sovereignty in her airspace to a certain extent which 
was more or less acceptable for Turkey for that time, however it could not reawaken
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interest in aviation in the country. Even after the entry into force of the Montreux 
Regime where Turkey acquired the right to regulate air traffic in her airspace which 
meant an even more satisfactory situation than Lausanne, Turkey again continued to 
display the state of apathy or isolationism against international aviation. That apathy 
only ended with the participation in the Chicago Conference on Civil Aviation in the 
year of 1944.
3.4.1. Forms of Isolationism
Lack of Interest in International Treaties
The isolationist policy indicated itself mainly in two forms. First Turkey did 
not participate in any of the multilateral or bilateral international treaties on aviation 
signed at the period before the Chicago Convention.
For instance, despite the amendments made in her favour in its Article 5, 
Paris Convention of 1919 never became an international treaty on aviation including 
Turkey as one of its parties. Turkey remained totally outside of that treaty. In fact 
there had been a declaration of Turkey in Ai ticle 100 of the Lausanne Convention as 
to become a party in 1923. Nonetheless such participation never materialized. Even 
if Turkey officially related this to her specific geographical location, such a state of 
being outside the Convention was actually a typical reflection of the isolationist 
policy.
In that period there became a participation of Turkey in the first International 
Conference of Private Air Law held in October 26, 1925.^ '* However the Conference 
failed to be concluded with signing of an international treaty. Its mere result was the
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creation of International Technical Committee of Legal Experts officially called as 
C.l.T.E.J.A. to concern itself in particular with private air law i s sue s . I t  was an 
organisation consisting of legal committees each charged with studying a particular 
subject related to air law for instance the carrier’s liability, mortgage of aircraft, 
etc.^ ’^ However it is open to debate how significantly Turkey took place in that 
organisation’s machinery and studies. Thus, the participation of Turkey in the 
Conference of 1925 beared no concrete results and in fact was not worth to be an 
exception to Turkey’s apathy towards international aviation matters.
In 1929 Turkey was officially invited to the conference in Warsaw which 
would result in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air dated October 12, 1929.^  ^However, the invitation was 
refused by Turkish Ministry of Economics of the time depending on the decision of 
the General Staff on that direction.^* That period was regarded as the peak of 
isolationism. It was many years after the end of that period, in 1977, when Turkey 
became a party to the Warsaw Convention.
Other international conventions from which Turkey excluded herself were the 
two Rome Conventions one of which was for the unification of certain rules relating 
to damage caused by aircraft to third parties on the surface and the other for the 
unification of certain rules relating to precautionary attachment of aircraft both of
TOwhich were concluded in May 29, 1933.
Apart from those multilateral international treaties Turkey also avoided the 
signing of bilateral agreements with any state during the isolationist period. The sole 
exception to this was the agreement on air traffic dated April 20,1937 signed with 
Iran in Teheran.
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Despite the general isolated situation of Turkey in fact in that period there 
had been some agreements concluded between Turkey and a few foreign airlines 
companies for the operation of scheduled air services. However, they did not last 
very long because of various factors related with Turkey’s preference of 
isolationism. Some of those agreements had been concluded with the following 
parties:
French-Romanian Airlines Company (CIDNA)
This company had been authorised by the new Turkish Government in 1924 
to operate air services between Bucharest and Istanbul. This permission had 
continued until the year of 1936 when Turkish Airlines undertook the operation of 
services in the same route.
Italian Airlines Company (SAAEI)
In 1926 the regarding company had been granted the permission to carry 
passengers, mail and cargo between Istanbul and Brendizi. However the permission 
was abolished by the Turkish Government in 1936 because of the Italian intervention 
in Abyssinia which caused a serious international political crisis.
Junkers Werke and Lufthansa
In 1925 the Turkish Government had given a special permission to Junkers 
Werke, a German airlines company, to carry mail between Istanbul and Ankara but it 
was abolished after a short time. Another German company, Lufthansa, had been 
granted the right to transport mail and cargo between Istanbul and Berlin for a period 
of twenty years in 1930. Then the regarding seiwices had been enlarged to include 
Ankara and points in the Far East countries for the transportation of mails from 
Germany to the Far East. The carriage of passengers between Istanbul and Berlin had
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been added in 1939. The relations with Lufthansa had continued until 1944 the time 
of breaking of the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany.
Romanian State Airlines (L.A.R.E.S)
The Turkish Government had agreed with LARES on the transport of 
passengers, mail and cargo in 1939. However the agreement had lost its effectiveness 
with the German invasion to Rumania in the following year.
At first sight all these relations might indicate that Turkey had a policy which 
was open for international air services also before the Second World War and the 
Chicago Convention. However, in fact those had been small scale and small period 
arrangements and had lasted a very short time. Even some of them had been 
withdrawn by Turkey before entering into force for various reasons all related with 
Turkey’s general attitude of staying outside international aviation and keeping the 
internal air industry. Besides inner-directed defensive policy of Turkey other reasons 
being more economic oriented and protectionist measures had all have a great impact 
on Turkey’s insufficient participation or rather isolationist attitude in the first half of 
the 20*^ ’ century. Therefore those relations were not enough to constitute a great 
exception to the isolationist policy of Turkey before the Chicago Convention.
Lack of Interest Against International Organisations, Studies and 
Developments about Aviation
At that period the most significant platform for scientific studies concerning 
international aviation was the so-called C.I.N.A. which meant International 
Commission for Air Navigation.''^
C.I.N.A. had been set up by the Paris Convention of 1919 to establish unity in 
international civil aviation matters and had been granted far reaching regulatoiy
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powers chiefly directed towards technical matters. Together with its formation the 
member states had agreed on aerial sovereignty and the compliance of aircraft in 
foreign airspace with the laws and rules of the air of that country. Standardised 
international rules of the air, airworthiness standards and pilot licensing were 
accepted while there became agreement for the mutual recognition of the standards, 
licences and regulations of other member states. Among the other functions of the 
Commission were the centralised gathering and publication of information on air 
navigation and the rendering of advice on matters submitted by member states. 
C.I.N.A. also laid the rules for international air navigation and landings at foreign 
airfields and the dissemination of meteorological information worldwide.
Perhaps one of the most vital functions of C.I.N.A. was to make necessary 
amendments in the annexes of the Paris Convention caused by changing techniques, 
technology and standards in aviation and developments in the conditions of air 
navigation. Therefore its basic goal was to keep the Paris Convention in pace with 
the changing conditions and techniques in aviation.'*^
Despite its existing shortcomings and facing rivalries from the later Ibero- 
American Air Convention and the Pan-American Convention of Commercial 
Aviation set up by the U.S. and the Hispanic-speaking countries, C.I.N.A. paved the 
way for the later more effective efforts made by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (I.C. A.O.) after the Second World War on the same fields.
As regards Turkey, because of the fact that Turkey did not participate in the 
Paris Convention of 1919, simultaneously she could not have any official connection 
with C.I.N.A. Therefore she could not benefit from all those functions and studies of 
C.I.N.A. and there did not occur any advantage taken from that body for Turkey.
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Turkish air law of the time could not benefit from the developments in international 
air law produced by the studies of C.I.N.A.
Another centre for international scientific studies on aviation was the 
International Technical Committee of Legal Experts officially called C.I.T.E.J.A. 
that had been formed by the Paris Convention of 1925. C.I.T.E.J.A. had came into 
being during the first International Conference of Private Air Law held in 1925. It 
consisted of numerous legal committees each of them charged with studying a 
particular subject related to air law, for instance the carrier's liability, mortgage of 
aircraft, etc. It was concerned in particular with private air law issues.
Although she was included in that Convention Turkey did not take place in 
the first conference of that organisation held in Paris between May 24-26, 1926.
However at the second conference dated April 6, 1927 Turkey was 
represented by one delegate from the Embassy in Paris and by this way Turkey was 
included in the preparatory stage of the draft for the Warsaw Convention.
That draft was dealt with by C.I.T.E.J.A. for a revision in its third meeting in 
Madrid dated May 24-29. 1929 where Turkey was also represented by one delegate 
from the Embassy in Madrid. However that time the delegate was only attributed the 
status of observer. That was the extent of Turkey's relations with the C.I.T.E.J.A.
3.4.2. Implications of the Isolationist Policy
Turkey’s lack of concern about international aviation matters before the 
Chicago Convention was purely based on two reasons. The primary one was the
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defence of the country in general. Related with this the other was the idea that if 
Turkey could not benefit from the airspace of other states especially her neighbours, 
then those states should not be given the opportunity to benefit from the airspace of 
Turkey. Many of those neighbour states were not parties to a number of international 
air agreements and there was not the possibility for Turkey to get into mutual or 
other forms of agreements with them.
Basically, the General Staff of the time was holding the view that the 
navigation of foreign aircrafts over Turkey could lead to the monitoring of Turkish 
territory by foreign powers which would have harmful effects for the defence of the 
country. For this reason the trend was not only to prohibit flying over particular 
zones but to prohibit flying over as large as the whole countiy. The limitation was on 
its largest extent. Namely Turkey favored closing her airspace to almost all foreign 
aircrafts.
As a ramification of this the international airways directed towards Far East 
started to flow to the direction of Greece and Egypt. In addition Greece had 
flourished as a point having vital importance for international airways. In other 
words Turkey’s policy of closing her airspace to foreign aircraft indirectly benefitted 
other countries, mainly Greece. International air services to the Far and Middle East 
started to pass from Greece and furthermore this resulted in a great loss of wealth for 
Turkey which would otherwise be acquired by Turkey if she would open her airspace 
and become one of the most important junctions in terms of international air traffic.“*^
Moreover Turkey could not achieve any single development in aviation 
techniques because of the fact of not participating in any international study and also 
this left Turkey a very simple and straightforward national air law for that time.
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As time went by it became clear that the closing of airspace was not a 
convenient way for Turkey to defend the country also because of the innovations 
made in aviation technology. Thus gradually such a policy seemed more irrelevant. 
For instance, by means of new developments the photographs of many prohibited 
zones could easily been taken from aeroplanes without passing over those places. 
Similar technological developments were also proved by various events during the 
course of the Second World War. New technology started to overcome the old 
visions of foreign air policies.
Consequently, it was at that time of the realisation by Turkey that her nearly 
three decades of traditional air policy was gradually becoming unnecessary and 
refuted by new international developments, the first era of her air policy which might 
be called as a kind of isolationism came to an end with the decision taken by the 
Turkish State to participate in the Chicago Conference on aviation in 1944. This 
historical decision also signalled the starting of a new air policy vision which was 
now the collaboration with foreign states in terms of international aviation and being 
involved in aviation agreements whether multilateral or bilateral.
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CHAPTER 4
TUITKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL AVIATION IN THE 
SECOND HALF OF THE 20th CENTURY 
(AFTER THE CHICAGO CONVENTION):
ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
4.1. The Chicago Convention
The changing visions together with innovations made in aviation technology 
which eventually led Turkey to change her attitude on international aviation 
continued to work during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath and 
also affected the policies of other states as well as Turkey. At the end of the war the 
US appeared as the leading power of the world in all aspects including aviation. The 
US could achieve considerable developments on aviation throughout the war and it 
was enough evident that other states would not be able to match up easy with the US 
for a long period of time.
The fact that aircrafts of the American Army were almost much more 
versatile for civil services after the war when compared with other states provided an 
enormous aviation industrial complex for that superpower in the post Second World 
War period. For instance; many of the former heavy bombers were modified into 
civil aircrafts by the state and sold to airline companies with little charges.
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Such a tremendous economy in the field was growing at the disadvantage of 
other states. The US started pioneering services in the Western Hemisphere across 
the Atlantic and the Pacific. When that aviation industry of the US started to look for 
new markets to grow there appeared the necessity that the whole airspace 
surrounding the Earth had to be free for the American companies. This meant that the 
superiority of the US on aviation required a total liberalization of airspace to meet 
the demands of that large industry.
As a result other states were invited by the US for a conference on aviation in 
order to establish the freedom of traffic in the airspace surrounding the whole world. 
The US also decided to form an organisation to which she will be a party with a 
dominant say and a regime in her favour .The  convening of that conference was 
significant also because the Paris Convention of 1919 could not achieve opening 
airspace to international services although it could regulate air navigation to some 
degree. Because it had recognised the principle of complete and exclusive 
sovereignty of states over the airspace above their territories then states by this way 
had found a legal basis to continue being jealous of their airspace. Some concessions 
by states could only be given between themselves in a strict sense through bilateral 
agreements that were not sufficient to establish any international air service covering 
the whole world.
Thus, the ultimate end of the US was a complete freedom of airspace. 
However as being the most industrialised state in aviation the US also faced 
particular objection from many other states which were in a relatively 
disadvantageous position. Britain for instance had come out from the war as 
economically damaged. During the war Britain had been engaged much more in
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building small military aircrafts when compared with the US, This meant that the 
British aircraft could not contribute to the development of after-war aviation industry 
in Britain. This signalled the disadvantage of Britain in the face of the US.
Therefore, different positions were taken at the conference held in Chicago. 
The views of the American and British delegations were diametrically opposed. The 
US accepted maintenance of sovereignty in airspace but desired that restrictions on 
the operation of international air transport services be kept to a minimum. The US 
during wartime had industrially reinforced her position and was in fact seeking the 
revision of the rigid doctrine of absolute sovereignty that had been established by the 
Paris Convention in 1919 hoping that the time was ripe for a more liberal approach in 
terms of air.
The British Government agreed upon the point of sovereignty in airspace but 
was strongly committed to regulation especially in the economic field. It proposed 
the establishment of an international air authority that would license operators, 
determine and allocate frequencies and fix tariffs. The doctrine of state sovereignty 
would be preserved. Namely because of her disadvantage in terms of aircraft 
capabilities compared with the US, Britain proposed the preservation of state 
sovereignty but at the same time the establishment of an international air authority to 
regulate air navigation.
While the US favoured the existence of competition in terms of the 
development of international aviation and multilateral exchange of traffic rights for 
the orderly establishment of international air services, Britain called for international 
ownership and operation of all air services.
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Therefore the two parties' views differed very much from each other. The US 
side advocated total liberalism and the attitude of British side was called as 
regulationism.'*^
However those differences were resolved to some degree by means of a 
compromise between the two groups of states leaded by the US and Britain. Thus the 
major achievement in terms of international civil aviation after the Second World 
War, the conference held in Chicago, came into being. The result was the signing of 
the Chicago Convention in December 17, 1944 that came into force on April 4, 1947 
the date of the registration of the 26*^ ' instrument of ratification.
Especially in the technical sphere the Conference was a success. By today's 
experience and standards in international decision making and drafting of legal texts, 
it achieved a considerable result by the drafting, adoption and opening for signature 
of one major convention, three agreements, a standard form of bilateral agreements 
for provisional air routes and the text of twelve draft technical annexes.'’^  Since states 
holding different views could not come to understanding in one single document they 
applied the way of signing different conventions and a final act. The following 
instruments were adopted in Chicago and opened for signature:
-The Convention on International Civil Aviation (also called the Chicago 
Convention)
-The Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation 
-The International Air Services Transit Agreement 
-The International Air Transport Agreement 
-Draft of Technical Annexes
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As a result of the compromise reached in the Conference state sovereignty in 
airspace was preserved and written in the first article of the Convention:
Article 1: "Each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over 
the airspace above its territory"
However, there were two freedoms of air established in the International Air 
Services Transit Agreement and five freedoms in the Air Transport Agreement for 
the aim of providing the establishment of air services between countries all over the 
world.
The Internatioiiai Air Services Transit Agreement:
The following freedoms were granted by each contracting state to the other:
1) The privilege to fly across the territory of a contracting state without landing.
2) The privilege to land for iion-trafFic purposes (any technical or operational 
reason).
The Transit Agreement greatly achieved its purpose. Currently ninety-five states 
are party to this agreement for the multilateral exchange of freedoms of air.'*^
The International Air Transport Agreement:
This agreement repeated the freedoms given in the Transit Agreement and 
provided for the exchange of additional three freedoms defined as follows:
3) The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the territory of 
the state whose nationality the aircraft possesses.
4) The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of the 
state whose nationality the aircraft possesses.
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5) The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of 
any other contracting state and the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo 
coming from any such territory.'**
However the Transport Agreement consisting of the five freedoms could not 
achieve a worldwide acceptance. Only twenty states signed the Agreement and 
seventeen of them ratified. Especially the states having geographical significance in 
terms of international air services were reluctant to open their airspace to 
international scheduled services by means of a multilateral agreement. In other words 
states' interests worked against the freedoms proposed by the Transport Agreement. 
The result was that the Transport Agreement never came into effect.
Realising that disappointing situation first the US in July 25.1946 declared 
that he will be outside the Chicago Convention. Other states followed the US later. 
Scheduled and Non-Scheduled Services:
The freedoms of air included in those two agreements were in respect of 
scheduled flights. In the Chicago Convention a distinction was made between 
scheduled and non-scheduled services. Article 6 of the Convention referred to 
scheduled international air service without defining the word "scheduled" and Article 
5 referred to the right of non-scheduled flight without providing any further 
definition. Therefore the terms were not clearly indicated in the Convention but a 
definition for scheduled services was adopted by the ICAO Council on March 28, 
1952. An international air service was accepted as a scheduled service if the 
following conditions are met:
a) Passing through the airspace of more than one state.
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b) Performed for the transport for reward of passengers, mail or cargo and available 
to the public.
c) Operated between the same points either according to a published timetable or in 
a recognisably systematic pattern.'*^
To operate scheduled services over or into the territory of a contracting state a 
permission or authorisation of that state was necessary. For non-scheduled flights 
such a permission was not required, provided that the aircraft is not going to land at 
all or is to land only for non-traffic purposes, other than for the purposes of taking on 
or setting down passengers, mail or cargo. However the aircraft might be required to 
land by the state and also might be required to follow prescribed routes or obtain 
special permission for such flights.
The Technical Annexes:
18 Annexes giving technical rules in the implementation of the Convention were 
added such as personnel licensing, rules of the air, meteorological service for 
international air navigation, etc.^°
All those Annexes were almost consisting of all technical concepts related to 
aviation that was from now on becoming an enormous industry throughout the world. 
Establishment of ICAO:
Besides the freedoms of air and technical annexes the Chicago Convention 
also provided some regulatory measures for international aviation. This was 
indicated by the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) of which the constitutional terms were contained in Part II, Chapter VII of 
the Convention. The Convention itself formed the Organisation in Article 43:
4.3
"An organisation to be named as the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation is formed by the 
Convention. It is made up o f an Assembly, a Council 
and such other bodies as maybe necessary"
ICAO became a Specialised Agency of the UN soon after its creation on May 
13, 1947 and was for that reason invested with special powers pursuant to Article 64 
of the Chicago Convention. The contracting states agreed to establish that institution 
with the aim of simplifying and standardising teclmical, legal and economic 
regulations concerning air transportation.
Thus the technical aspect of civil aviation "air-navigation" and the economic 
aspect "air-transportation" were both considered to be on equal footing among the 
aims and objectives of ICAO.
The ICAO became more effective in the technical sphere. Because the 
Chicago Convention failed to moderate complete and exclusive sovereignty of states 
over their airspace by a multilateral agreement on the exchange of commercial traffic 
rights, it was inevitable that they were reluctant to concede any power to the ICAO 
which could influence the economic future of their air transport. Therefore, the 
ICAO was far away from having a supranational character. Nevertheless it could 
more or less provide a harmonisation in international aviation.
The Result of the Chicago Convention in General
The Chicago Convention more or less succeeded in developing a viable 
framework for the post Second World War air transport in the world. The freedoms 
of air it set forth could not gain a worldwide acceptance and thus it failed to achieve 
a multilateral exchange of traffic rights. However those became the model form and
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have had a significant impact on the subsequent bilateral agreements concerning 
international air transport and services. In this respect it was a starting point for the 
post war harmonisation of international civil aviation.
Although the complete and exclusive sovereignty of states over their airspace 
was kept, the limitations on the use of that sovereignty were indicated in the form of 
air freedoms and the principles of equal rights of access to air transport for all nations 
of the world, the absence of discrimination and non-interference. Also a high degree 
of safety was put as a condition in air transport and navigation.
As a result although it did not resolve the conflicts and disagreements at all, 
for all its shortcomings the Chicago Convention provided a basis for the 
development of international aviation throughout the world in the post Second World 
War Era.
4.2. Turkey and the Chicago Convention
Turkey's participation to the Chicago Convention signalled a new era in her 
foreign policy in regard of international civil aviation. Turkey was one of the fifty 
four states signing the documents at the end of the Conference in December 7, 1944, 
The Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, The Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention), The International Air 
Services Transit Agreement, The International Air Transport Agreement, The Draft 
of Technical Annexes and the Final Act.
The Turkish Delegate in the Conference was headed by Sukru Kocak. From 
the beginning up to the signing of the Final Act, Turkey actively involved in every
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phase of the Conference and generally accepted nearly all the out coming norms, 
perspective and decisions which were also reflected in the resulting Convention.
The exception was Turkey's negative approach and reservation about the fifth 
freedom of air, the privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the 
territory of any other contracting state and the privilege to put down passengers, mail 
and cargo coming from any such territory. In this respect a clause was written in the 
reservation stating "on the condition that it is accepted by the Government o f the 
Turkish Republic". Thus the recognition of the fifth freedom was totally left to the 
consent of the Turkish Government.
The reason of putting forward such a reservation to the fifth freedom was 
mainly economic. The interests of Turkey regarding international air transportation 
taking place on her territory were taken into consideration to a great extent. 
However, in fact, there became a conceptual or terminological confusion while 
stating the reason of the reservation. In putting the reservation the Turkish Delegate 
had moved with the aim of safeguarding Turkey's right of cabotage in the face of 
other contracting states. However, the longstanding definition of cabotage would in 
fact make it impossible for Turkey to apply such a term to the reason of putting a 
reservation to the fifth freedom of The Transportation Agreement.
The concept of cabotage had been incorporated into air law directly from
maritime law where it was held to apply to a state reserving itself the right to restrict 
all coastal navigation between two points witliin its territory for the exclusive use of
its own subjects. In air law cabotage means the traffic between the different 
territories of a state whether those territories are part of the same land mass or not.
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and it is also cabotage whether stops for traffic purposes are made at intermediate 
places outside a state's territory or not.^'
Moreover the concept has acquired a broader sense in air law and this was 
also reflected in the Chicago Convention where a state may reserve to itself the 
exclusive right of air transport within its own territorial limits and its overseas 
territories as well as between those two areas of sovereignity.^^ In the Chicago 
Convention cabotage was handled in Chapter II, Article 7:
“Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the 
aircraft o f other contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, 
mail and cargo carried fo r renumeration or hire destined fo r another 
point within its territory. Each contracting State undertakes not to enter 
into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an 
exclusive basis to any other State or an airline o f any other State and not 
to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other State ”
Thus, according to the Convention the right of cabotage only belonged to the 
State in its own territory. The objective in establishing such a principle was to protect 
states’ interests regarding air navigation and transportation in their own territories.^^ 
Therefore cabotage means the carriage of passengers, mail and cargo in the territory 
of a state from one point to another. In this regard services from one state to its 
neighbours or any others cannot be considered as cabotage. It has to be limited 
within the territory of one single state. For this reason to relate Turkey's reservation 
on the fifth freedom to cabotage can be explained merely as a mistake in terms of 
terminology.
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In any way in the Chicago Conference the fifth freedom was considered as a 
limitation to Turkey’s right of cabotage and the Turkish Delegate left the issue to the 
decision of the Turkish Government whether to recognise that freedom in different 
times or not.
Turkey’s Becoming a Member of ICAO:
As a result of her collaboration and cooperation with other states on matters 
of international aviation which is included in the policy of active involvement 
Turkey participated in the Chicago Conference and was directly involved in the 
preparatory phase of the resulting Chicago Convention. The Convention, together 
with the efforts for the regulation of air-traffic, services and transportation, also 
foresaw the creation of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to this 
end which was then incorporated in Part 11.^  ^ Thus in 1945 the time of signing the 
Convention, Turkey automatically became a member of the ICAO and this was 
ratified by the law number 4749. Today Turkey is among the one hundred and eighty 
three states that are members of that organisation.
4.3. Bilateral Air Agreements and the Bermuda Agreement
The Chicago Conference at least achieved a general consensus and 
compromise between the participant states in terms of international civil aviation. 
The Conference resulted in the conclusion of the Chicago Convention in December 
17, 1944 which included a Final Act and its Annexes. Among those Annexes, The 
International Air Transport Agreement, which contained the largest number of air 
freedoms was signed only by twenty states and many of those states including the
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U.s.,the greatest power on aviation, later on withdrew from the Agreement. They 
were mostly reluctant to give those five freedoms to more than one state at the same 
time by means of a multilateral international treaty. Otherwise this would cause to 
the opening of their airspace immediately at once to all others which could bring 
about certain ramifications minimising the protection of their national economic 
interests. In addition political aspirations, military policies, public safety and similar 
factors were also standing against a multilateral granting of air freedoms by states 
among themselves. The principle of sovereignty of a state over the airspace above its 
territory still had the priority for the safeguarding of national interests. Therefore the 
difficulty of the general establishment of a free airspace and liberalising international 
air traffic was indicating itself once again.
As a result, when it became apparent that achieving more freedom in the air 
by means of exchanging the five freedoms in a multilateral convention was 
impossible, states had to turn to bilateral agreements for granting each other certain 
rights. Because most of the states did not adopt the Transport Agreement there was 
no other way to obtain the right to fly over or into the territory of a foreign state and 
rights of entry for the purposes of picking up or setting down passengers, mail or 
cargo for reward. They could only happen by means of bilateral agreements. In short 
the establishment of international air services and regulation of air traffic could only 
be possible by means of various bilateral agreements between countries.
As a matter of fact the right to conclude bilateral agreements had also been 
recognised to the contracting states by the Chicago Convention on the condition that 
they would not behave contrary to the Convention . This right was included in 
Chapter XVII, Article 83:
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“Any contracting State may make arrangements not inconsistent with the 
provisions o f this Convention. Any such arrangement shall be forthwith 
registered with the Council, which shall make it public as soon as 
possible ”
Hence the era of international civil aviation after the Chicago Convention is 
characterised by the conclusion of a large number of bilateral agreements which are 
accepted as the main source of law in respect of exchange of traffic rights and the 
operation of services between countries. There have been approximately 1,200 
agreements concluded in this way.^ *’
From the beginning all these were based on Article 6 of the Chicago 
Convention which stated that no scheduled international air service may be operated 
over or into the territory of a contracting state, except with the special permission or 
an authorisation of that state, and in accordance with the terms of such a permission 
or authorisation. Furthermore, in these bilateral agreements the text of certain articles 
of the Chicago Convention was often incorporated. In other words these agreements 
have always been dependent upon the principles and rights contained in the 
Convention.
The Bermuda Agreement
All the bilateral air agreements concluded after the Chicago Convention have 
been based on one standard type that is The Bermuda Agreement signed on February 
11. 1946. between the U.S. and Britain. It was an air services agreement between the 
two leading powers in aviation after the Second World War and it became a model 
for all subsequent bilateral agreements.
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The Bermuda Agreement consisted of three parts: The Final Act, The 
Agreement and The Annex. The Final Act of the bilateral conference in Bermuda set 
forth a number of general principles on matters such as definitions of freedom of air, 
fair and equal opportunity, clauses on capacity, air fares and rates, customs, tariffs, 
arbitrations and routes .Those principles and definitions were to be reproduced in 
the later bilateral agreements and the same subjects were taken up as the main topics. 
Moreover most of those ones signed later have been called as Bermuda-type- 
agreements.
The U.S. and Britain whose views had conflicted during the Chicago 
Conference were able to reach a compromise on the exchange of commercial traffic 
rights in Bermuda. In this respect the Agreement was a compromise between 
liberalism on one side and regulationism or protectionism on the other. The main 
issues of international aviation are routes, tariffs and capacity. The Agreement was 
liberal in terms of routes and capacity a tenn related with the demand for an air 
service over a route which was particularly reflected in the capacity clauses of the 
Agreement.
The clauses contained in the Final Act were the following;
1) The capacity offered should bear a close relationship to the requirements of 
public for such transport.
2) There should be a fair and equal opportunity for the carriers of the carriers of the 
two nations to operate on any route between their respective territories.
3) The interests of the air carriers of the other government shall be taken into 
consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides on 
all or part of the same routes.
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4) The primary objective of the air carriers is the provision of capacity adequate to 
the traffic demands between the country of which such air carrier is a national 
and the country of ultimate destination of the traffic.^*
The two states would be subject to the principle that capacity should be related:
a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of 
destination,
b) to the requirements of airline operation,
c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after 
taking account of local and regional services.
In general, a flexible capacity arrangement was that the parties avoided a 
strict determination of capacity in advance. The designated carriers acquired the right 
to determine their production on any route. So all the capacity, decisions about the 
flights, necessary equipment and other related issues were left to the decision of the 
designated airline companies only subject to the review of aeronautical authorities of 
the contracting states. In short, the capacity had to be determined on the basis of 
traffic actually carried.
Liberalism in the Agreement continued with the issue of routes which was 
handled in the Annex. The Agreement contained a broad indication and definition of 
routes served by scheduled international air services including various points of 
departure in one country, intermediate points, destinations in each other country or 
the points beyond.^’ In a case of changing the routes the aeronautical authorities of 
the two countries would be informed accordingly.
While almost an unrestricted capacity system and multiple route designations 
were established on the basis of liberal view, the tariff regime in the Annex of the
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Agreement on the contrary reflected regulationism. Mainly fares and rates were to be 
discussed and determined by the designated carriers preferably through the 
machinery provided by the International Air Traffic Association (lATA). In the 
lATA traffic conferences rates would be fixed and also approved by the 
governments. So the I AT A entered into scheduled international air services as the 
regulatory organ for tariffs and rates. The intervention of lATA was also kept in 
other bilateral agreements later and this indirectly created a multilateral consensus 
through many different bilateral agreements.
If an agreement could not be reached through the I AT A, then the designated 
airlines would seek an agreement among themselves. Otherwise, the governments of 
the contracting states would handle the case and try to determine the tariffs to be 
applied on the routes concerned. The airlines had to submit proposals on tariffs to 
their national aeronautical authorities for approval.
In general the Bermuda Agreement was a prototype agreement in the field of 
bilateral air agreements after the Second World War in terms of either the principles 
and exchange of freedoms it set forth greatly depending on the Chicago convention 
or its format consisting of a Final Act, the Agreement and the Annex. Shortly first in 
the Final Act after stating their desire to develop the benefits of air travel for the 
general good of mankind, the governments of the U.S. and Britain reiterated their 
adherence to the principles of the Chicago Convention. Then the capacity clauses 
relating to air traffic and the statement that there should be regular and frequent 
consultation between the aeronautical authorities of the two countries were added.
The Agreement consisted of fourteen articles set the procedure, rules to be 
obsei'ved and various rights of the parties. For instance; in Article 13 there should be
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no discrimination by one country against the air carriers of the other country 
concerning the fees for the use of airports and other facilities or the customs duties, 
inspection fees and other charges on fuel, lubricants and spare parts taken on in one 
country by an air carrier of the other. Furthermore any of those materials retained on 
board an aircraft of one country were made exempt from customs duty in the other 
country, even though such supplies be used within that country.
According to Article 5, certificates of airworthiness or competency and 
licenses under the law of one country were accepted as valid under the law of the 
other. All laws and regulations of one country relating to the entry into or departure 
of aircraft, crew, passengers and cargo would be applicable to aircraft, crew, 
passengers and cargo of the other country while in the territory of the first country. 
Each country would designate one or more airlines to be authorised by the other 
party for the operation of the agreed services.
Each country had the right to exclude air carriers designated by the other, if it 
is not satisfied that the substantial ownership or effective control of such carriers are 
vested in nationals of either country, or if such carriers fail to comply with the laws 
and regulations referred to in Article 5.
Finally in the Agreement to be registered with the ICAO according to Article 
7, the settlement of any disputes arising over the interpretation of that agreement 
were left to the ICAO by Article 9. From then onwards registration with the ICAO 
became mand^^oiy for countries whipfi ^dhere to the Chicago Convention.
The thir^ p^rt the I^pripuda Agreement was the Annex. It was made up of 
five sections. Mainly the freedoms of air to be afforded by the two countries took 
place in the Annex in relation to the routes to be used by the air carriers of those
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countries. In Section I the carriers of each country were accorded the use of airports 
and other facilities in the territoiy of the other country together with the rights of 
transit, stops for non-traffic (non-commercial) purposes and commercial entry and 
departure. The intervention of lATA in tariff fixing was explained in Section II.
In Section III the routes to be served by the carriers of each country were 
specified in detail with various points of departure, intermediate points, destinations 
and beyond points. Thus all the freedoms of air which had been set by the 
International Air Transport Agreement in the Chicago Convention were recognised 
for the two countries no matter what their proportions were for each country. The 
term “beyond points” referred to the points other than the ones in the territory of each 
country and intermediate places. It was related with the traffic originating from or 
destined to third countries and so it was the expression of the fifth freedom. Due to 
its strong air traffic capabilities, potential and resources, the U.S. gained more point 
rights for his air carriers in the Bermuda Agreement. Section IV dealt with changes 
in the routes and exchange of information in the designation of one or more airlines 
by each country.
Finally Section V included permission for a change of gauge which means 
where the onward carriage of traffic by an aircraft of different size from that 
employed on the earlier stage of the same route is justified by economic reasons. 
Such a change of gauge should not be in violation of the principles set forth in the 
Final Act.^
The Bermuda Agreement did not contain any provision explicitly stating the 
sovereignty of the two parties over the airspace above their countries. However, in 
fact the Agreement itself was an indirect repetition of the principle of sovereignty
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over airspace. This was proved by the adherence of the parties to the principles of the 
Chicago Convention, their obligation to comply with the laws and regulations of 
each other while entering in the airspace of the other side and exchange of freedoms 
between each other.
In general, the Bermuda Agreement remained as a model type for the 
following bilateral agreements including the ones concluded by Turkey. Although 
sometimes there became small changes the overall format and principles it set forth 
were repeated more or less in the same way.
4.4. Bilateral Air Agreements Concluded by Turkey
Turkey during the era of isolationism, the period before the Chicago 
Convention, had closed her airspace against international traffic. As a result of such a 
policy Turkey had avoided entering into international agreements regulating air 
transport and air navigation. While remaining outside those multilateral treaties 
Turkey had also abstained from concluding bilateral agreements on civil aviation. 
The only exception to that situation had been the bilateral air services agreement 
signed with Iran in the date of April 20, 1937. In fact before the Second World War 
there had also been air transportation to Turkey operated by French and Italians. 
However, because no available written document related with those practices could 
be found it is not clear whether those were short term specially granted permission or 
arrangements based on any bilateral treaty. Therefore the agreement concluded with 
Iran is accepted as the only bilateral document about air transportation concluded by 
Turkey in the period before the Chicago Convention.
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Since her participation in the Chicago Conference of 1944 Turkey’s policy 
towards international aviation started to change and this was reflected in the signing 
of various international documents multilateral or bilateral.
The whole bilateral air agreements concluded by Turkey are in conformity 
with the principles stated basically in the Chicago Convention. Moreover, the 
Bermuda Agreement of 1946 was taken as a model in those agreements as well as in 
the ones between other states. Neither of those documents concluded by Turkey 
contains an explicit sentence saying that the parties have complete and exclusive 
sovereignty over the airspace above their territories. However, in fact, those 
agreements all imply the sovereignty of the parties. For instance, mostly in the first 
articles it is stated that the parties bilaterally grant each other certain rights and 
freedoms to provide the establishment of international air services. These rights are 
indicated in detail in the Annex of each agreement such as the right to fly across the 
territory of each state without landing, to land for non-traffic purposes and 
commercial rights of putting down or taking on passengers, mail and cargo in the 
territory of each state. This means that those rights can only be granted in a regime 
where the states have complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above 
their territories. Thus it is an implicit recognition of the sovereignty of the parties.
Furthermore, there are also principles included in most of those agreements 
such as cabotage, forbidden zones and the obligation to comply with the laws and 
regulations of each state that can only be explained in terms of the sovereignty of the 
parties.
On the other hand certain statements in most of those agreements indirectly 
recognise the principle of sovereignty. For instance it is explained that both parties
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adhere to the Chicago Convention where the main principle is the sovereignty of 
states. Such clauses were firstly included in the preamble of the bilateral agreements 
between Turkey and Egypt in 1950 and Iran in 1951. Those all include the adherence 
of the parties to the Chicago Convention of December 7, 1944.
Finally, as the Chicago Convention prohibited states to enter into any 
agreement inconsistent with its terms, the bilateral agreements following the 
Convention including those of Turkey have all been in conformity with the principle 
of sovereignty in the first article of the Convention.
While the bilateral air agreements of Turkey have all been based on the 
principles of the Chicago Convention their general format various rules and 
arrangements foreseen have been more or less similar to that of the Bilateral 
Agreement of Bermuda of February 11,1946
Like the Bermuda Agreement, Turkey’s bilateral agreements generally 
consist of a Final Act, an Agreement including a number of articles and an Annex 
attached to the end. In the Final Act the parties mostly reaffirm their adherence to the 
principles and purposes set out in the Chicago Convention and state that they as 
being parties to the Chicago Convention have reached an agreement to establish 
international air services between their territories and beyond. This is almost the 
same explanation in the Bermuda Agreement.
In the Agreement as in the Bermuda prototype, Turkey and the other 
contracting party grant each other rights to establish scheduled international air 
services in the routes described in the Annex. From now on those services were 
called “the agreed services” and the routes were called “the specified routes” which 
is exactly the same as in Bermuda Agreement. The regarding rights are non­
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commercial rights of flying across the territory of other state without landing and 
landing for non-traffic purposes and commercial rights of putting down or taking on 
passengers, mail and cargo in the points in the territory of each state which are 
specified in the Annex. The fifth freedom was at the discretion of the Turkish 
Government whether to grant or not.
In that part again there take place the obligation of the parties to comply with 
the laws and regulations of each other in carrying out international air services and 
the right of each party to exclude air carriers designated by the other if it is not 
satisfied that the ownership and effective control of such carriers are vested in 
nationals of either side or if such carriers violate or contravene the laws and 
regulations of each side.
In Bermuda any dispute over the interpretation of the agreement would be 
settled by the ICAO. The bilateral agreements of Turkey also foresee an eventual 
settlement through ICAO assistance. In case of a dispute on interpretation or 
implementation of the agreement, the parties would first try to reach a settlement 
through negotiation between themselves. If a solution cannot be found then the 
dispute would be handled by a specific person or legal entity elected by the parties or 
through arbitration. Each party would elect one arbitrator and those two arbitrators 
would elect a third in a certain period. If an arbitrator cannot be elected in the 
specified period then the President of the Council of the ICAO would appoint an 
arbitrator upon the request of one of the parties. Thus in the settlement of disputes 
arising over the bilateral agreements of Turkey there is also a certain place for the 
assistance of ICAO. Another point written in the Agreement is that as in Bermuda, 
the bilateral agreement has to be registered with ICAO.
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As to the Annex like Bermuda, there exist the rights and freedoms of air that 
Turkey and the other party grant each other in relation with the agreed services and 
the specified routes in both directions by the air carriers of the two parties. The 
airlines designated by the Turkish Government and the other contracting state have 
the right to establish air services between the points and beyond that have been 
specified beforehand.*'* Thus Turkey and the other contracting state grant the air 
carriers of each the right to use particular airports and the other facilities of each 
other with the right of transit, stops for non-traffic purposes and commercial entry 
and departure. These rights are the reiteration of the ones in the Chicago Convention. 
Moreover the method used to establish international air traffic between Turkey and 
the other contracting state is a reflection of the Bilateral Agreement of Bermuda.
Such a content has existed almost in all of the bilateral air agreements 
concluded by Turkey. Hence it is apparent that Turkey has also acted in harmony 
with the international community regarding the conclusion of bilateral agreements 
after the Second World War which depend on the Chicago Convention and the 
Bermuda Agreement.
Turkey started to conclude bilateral agreements first with the United States 
and Britain in 1946. This continued with the agreements signed with Sweden and 
France in the same year. Including those four countries, from 1946 onwards Turkey 
has concluded bilateral air services agreements with 82 countries. Those countries 
are the following: Germany, United States, Britain, Austria, Australia, Afghanistan, 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, Bahrain, 
Belgium, Bellorussia, Czech Republic, China, Algeria, Denmark, Indonesia, France, 
Finland, Morocco, South Korea, Georgia, South Africa, Holland, India, Croatia, Iraq,
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Iran, Israel, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Canada, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Cuba, Lebanon, Libya, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Lettonia, 
Egypt, Hungary, Malta, Malaysia, Moldavia, Macedonia, Mongolia, Norway, Oman, 
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russian Federation, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Jordan, Yugoslavia, Greece, Aden, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Estonia, Japan and Hong-Kong/’^
As a result the second era of Turkey’s policy on international civil aviation 
which can be called as the policy of active involvement has been on one side 
achieved through conclusion of bilateral agreements with different states and 
participation in certain multilateral treaties.
4.5. Other Multilateral Treaties on International Civil Aviation to which Turkey 
is a Party
The new policy of Turkey concerning international civil aviation that is the
policy of active involvement after the Chicago Convention has also been indicated 
by Turkey’s taking part in certain international multilateral treaties other than the
Chicago Convention. In this respect while the conclusion of bilateral air transport
agreements by Turkey constitutes the first aspect of her air transport policy after the
Second World War which still continues, the second aspect is Turkey’s becoming
party to international multilateral treaties governing the current international regime
for air transport.
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The very first of these was the Chicago Convention that signalled a 
modification of Turkey’s policy until that time. The participation of Turkey to the 
Conference in 1944 signalled the end of isolationist policy and the starting of a new 
vision which reflected itself as involvement in international civil aviation issues and 
cooperation with other countries worldwide. There were two other significant 
multilateral treaties regulating the rules and standards in international air 
transportation and which are accepted as the major pillars of the system, The Warsaw 
Convention together with its amendments and The Multilateral Paris Agreement on 
Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services in Europe. Turkey became a 
party to both of these and the adoption of these three significant treaties mainly 
constitutes the multilateral aspect of that new policy.
4.5.1. The Warsaw Convention
As civil aviation started to develop and expand worldwide in the first half of 
the 20*^* century there became a need for detailed rules to be applied to legal 
transactions in terms of international carriage of passengers and cargo. On the one 
hand, international civil aviation was related with different state interests. Thus, in a 
way it was a matter of international politics or economics. On the other hand it also 
included a great amount of private international law elements. This is because air 
transportation was directly a carriage of persons or cargo related with those persons 
to a great extent. There was a confusion in terms of contract of carriage because 
different laws of countries included in on the matter of contract were at the same 
time causing different interpretations on the contract. Therefore passengers or
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consignors of cargo were negatively affected from the problem of conflict of laws. 
Another source of that problem was the struggle for competence between the courts 
of the place where the contract is made, the place of departure and the destination or 
place in the territory of the country of which the passenger is a national. In short, as 
international civil aviation was developing either passengers, consignors or airline 
companies throughout the world were being affected from matters which had to be 
dealt in the context of private international law together with conflict of laws. A 
general consensus had to be reached in all those matters.
Hence the Warsaw Convention was concluded for the unification of certain 
rules relating to international carriage by air in 1929. It provided for universally 
accepted rules to avoid problems and disagreements arising from jurisdiction and 
choice of law and established the principle of the air carrier’s liability for damage on 
passengers, baggage and also damage caused by delay. In other words it formed the 
private law regime of international air transportation.*’^
From the beginning the rules set forth by the Warsaw Convention have been 
applied all over the world. Passengers know that whenever they travel by air there is 
a certain degree of uniformity in the rules governing the carrier’s liability and 
carriers being aware of the extent of their liability can make necessary arrangements 
to insure themselves against various incidents.*’'^  Before the Convention there were 
no uniform rules concerning the contract of carriage by air, the rights and obligations 
of the parties (such as passengers, crew and airline companies) and the air carrier’s 
liability. It was very difficult to deal with the issue by means of different national 
laws. The unification of the principles and rules with respect to international air 
transport was necessary to remove uncertainty and confusion.
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The Warsaw Convention that overcame all of the confusion and established 
uniform rules of private law in international air transportation is at the same time 
among the most widely accepted treaties on international air law. Over one hundred 
states are parties to the Convention.
The Convention applies only to international air transportation-the 
international carriage of persons, baggage or goods for reward. For the first time it 
introduced the obligation for carriers to issue a ticket for the carriage of passengers 
which would contain necessary information such as place and date of issue, points of 
departure and destination, intermediate stops if any, name and address of the carrier 
and a notice that the carriage is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. 
It was also made compulsory for the carrier to provide a baggage check and an 
airway bill.
As to the subject of liability three categories were established; the liability of 
the carrier, exclusion from liability and unlimited liability. The convention states that 
the air carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of death or wounding of a 
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger. It is also liable for 
damage to checked baggage or goods and damage by delay in the carriage of 
passengers, baggage or goods by air.
The carrier is excluded from liability if it is proven that all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage were taken or it was impossible to take such measures. 
It has no responsibility also if the damage was caused by the negligence of the 
injured person. The carrier has unlimited liability if the damage is caused by its 
wilful misconduct and in the absence of a passenger ticket, baggage check and 
airway bill.
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Throughout the time aviation continued to expand and develop worldwide. 
As a result various amendments and additions were made and the overall regime set 
by the Warsaw Convention acquired a dynamic nature.
As regards Turkey, although the Warsaw Convention was concluded in 1929 
its adoption by Turkey was realised after nearly fifty years. The reason was directly 
related with the two different policies of Turkey during the whole history of civil 
aviation. In 1929 Turkey had stayed outside the Convention because of the 
dominating isolationism on her foreign air policy. However, in the context of the 
active involvement policy the Warsaw Convention and the subsequent documents of 
amendments or additions were adopted by Turkey by the law 2073 and Turkey 
became a party to the Convention in March 1, 1977.
4.5.2. The Multilateral Paris Agreement on Commercial Rights of 
Non-Scheduled Services in Europe
Non-scheduled air services had occupied a place having minor importance at 
the time of the Chicago Convention. In those years international air transportation 
was at the beginning of development and non-scheduled services were relatively 
rare. For this reason the main concentration had been on the scheduled international 
air services and that became the overall topic of interest in the Chicago Convention. 
Only the Article 5 of the Convention dealt with non-scheduled services and aircraft 
of the contracting states acquired the right to establish those kind of services freely.
However, after the 1950s, non-scheduled services started to expand in the 
world especially with the development of charter services. This brought the necessity
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of reconsidering the issue. Because of the new situation Article 5 of the Chicago 
Convention giving complete freedom for the establishment of non-scheduled services 
lost its validity in practice. States and airline companies began to compete with each 
other in this kind of services as well as scheduled services.
As a result the Multilateral Paris Agreement of 1956 came into stage to reach 
a consensus regarding the new situation of non-scheduled services. The Agreement 
to which Turkey is also a party brought certain limitations to the principle of freedom 
for services recognised by Article 5 of the Chicago Convention such as the condition 
that those services should not compete with and give harm to established scheduled
services.65
4.6. The International Organisations Concerning with Civil Aviation of which 
Turkey is a Member
Turkey’s policy of active involvement in international aviation after the 
Second World War indicated itself in particular forms. The first was her participation 
in a number of multilateral international treaties. Also after the signing of the 
Chicago Convention Turkey started to enter into bilateral agreements with many 
states to establish regular air services.. Those agreements became the main sources 
regulating the establishment of air services by the air carriers of Turkey and other 
contracting states.
Eventually the third aspect of that new active policy became the membership 
to particular international organisations. Turkey in the period after the Chicago
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Convention entered into particular international organisations in the field of civil 
aviation and became one of the active members of each.
4.6.1. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
The first of those organisations was ICAO established by the Chicago 
Convention in 1944 and which also became a Specialised Agency of the United 
Nations soon after its creation. Turkey became a member of ICAO in 1945 through 
the adoption of the Chicago Convention.The Organisation mainly works for the 
harmonisation, regulation and safety of international air transportation. The 
commercial aspect of air services is rather governed by various special agreements 
between states. In this regard, the ICAO mainly deals with technical matters and sets 
forth standards and recommended practices for the safety and sound development of 
international air transportation and navigation. All the member states are under an 
obligation to act consistent with those aims and related studies of the Organisation. 
Thus Turkey, being a member, goes along with the implementation of those 
standards, practices and also adoption and amendments whenever necessary.
4.6.2. The International Air Transport Association (lATA)
The I AT A came into being together with the reorganisation of international 
air transport at the end of the Second World War. It was founded in Havana in April 
1945 for the aims of promoting safe, regular and economical air transport for the 
benefit of the peoples of the world, fostering air commerce, studying the problems
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connected therewith, providing means for collaboration among the air transport 
enterprises engaged directly or indirectly in international air transport service and to 
cooperate with ICAO and other international organisations.®^ Its membership 
consists of airline companies and air transport enterprises which operate scheduled 
services under the flag of a state eligible for ICAO membership. Originally only 
scheduled airlines were eligible. Later on charter carriers were also made legally 
eligible, however, they did not take advantage of this possibility.
Among the main activities of the I AT A is the tariff coordination between 
airline companies. For this purpose Traffic Conferences are held where tariff 
agreements are discussed and concluded. The legal base of this practice comes 
mostly from the bilateral air agreements between countries.®^
The lATA also deals with the financial settlement of accounts among airlines. 
This is performed by a small but efficient unit called the Clearing House. Some 
airlines that are not members of the lATA are also allowed to participate in the
69Clearing House system.
On the other hand lATA acts as a link with governmental organisations on 
matters of general interest to civil aviation. It also acts as a professional organisation 
for the protection of the interests of its members. These areas include safety, security 
or airport facilities.™ For instance; lATA monitors the security conditions and takes 
anti-terrorism measures in airports.
Turkey’s membership in lATA, as well as other states, is not on the 
governmental level since the Association is a non-governmental organisation 
consisting of airline companies. Thus it is not the Turkish government but Turkish
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Airlines that is a member of lATA and this is indicated in all of the tickets issued by 
Turkish Airlines.
4.6.3. The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)
Beside international organisations having scope of activity worldwide, 
Turkey is also member of particular regional organisations dealing with air 
transportation. One of them is European Civil Aviation Conference which was 
created by the Council of Europe in 1955. Turkey, in the context of her new policy 
on international civil aviation, participated in this Conference and became one of the 
thirty-two members.
As to the Conference it works closely with the ICAO and benefits from its 
financial and administrative support. As being a regional settlement it also has close 
relationships with the Council of Europe and the European Union.
The main objective of ECAC is to facilitate, regulate and unify the air traffic 
between the European countries. Thus its studies have been concentrated on the 
orderly development and unification of intra-European air transport. Related with 
this objective one of the notable achievements of ECAC was the conclusion of the 
Multilateral Paris Agreement on the Rights of Non-Scheduled Services in Europe to 
which Turkey also became a party. In addition to its original aim ECAC also dealt 
with keeping the interests of European states in the face of third parties. This attitude 
was most clearly indicated in the ECAC-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding in 
1982 relating to fares and tariflfs.^^
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4.6.4. Eurocontrol
Another regional organisation including Turkey is the Convention for the 
Safety of air Navigation in Europe that is also called Eurocontrol. Turkey became a 
full member to to this organisation in March 1. 1989. Together with Turkey, sixteen 
European countries are included as members.
The aim of Eurocontrol is to provide safety, unification and integration 
tluoughout the airspace of European countries so that to achieve integration in the 
airspace of the whole Europe. Apart from Eurocontrol, in terms of safety Turkey is 
also a member of Airports Council International (ACI).
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
The participation of Turkey in international civil aviation after the Chicago 
Convention has been an ongoing process and Turkey’s current policy is still the 
continuation of active involvement in international civil aviation. The aspects of that 
policy are still apparent: Turkey is still party to the multilateral treaties on civil 
aviation and acts in conformity with the principles and provisions of them which 
stemmed from basically the Chicago Convention. Turkish Airlines and the current 
private airline companies of Turkey are also bound by the rules on safety, liability or 
standard practices set forth by the Warsaw Convention. Thus Turkish Airlines and 
private airline companies as well as in other countries continue to perform their 
business depending on the rules of the Warsaw Convention and its related annexes 
which form the current existing regime.
Besides multilateral treaties Turkey’s participation in international air 
services is mostly realised by bilateral agreements concluded with many countries. 
Currently there are agreements with eighty-two countries which establish and 
regulate international air traffic between Turkey and those countries. The agreements 
mainly based on the Bermuda prototype since the year of 1946. According to the 
needs of the traffic or other circumstances there may be amendments or 
rearrangements in those agreements. However, their basic format and main functions 
always remain the same.
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Another aspect of Turkey’s active involvement policy regarding international 
civil aviation is her membership to a number of international and regional 
organisations. The first of these is the ICAO of which Turkey is a member since 
1945 and Turkey from that year has been following the standards and criteria put 
forward by that organisation. A non-governmental organisation the lATA also has 
Turkey as a member in such a way that Turkish Airlines takes place therein. In 
addition to Turkish Airlines the private airline companies of Turkey are also bound 
by the lATA that they have to be registered by that organisation and indicate in the 
tickets they issue that they are members of lATA. Two important regional 
organisations of which Turkey is a member are ECAC and Eurocontrol. Turkey 
carries on keeping close relationship with those organisations and participates in their 
studies for the following of current international standards obeyed by the European 
states as well as others.
All these dimensions of active policy still exist and together they form 
Turkey’s place in international framework regarding civil aviation. Furthermore 
there are other indications of that policy. In Turkey now together with Turkish 
Airlines there are nine private airline companies and those private companies also 
operate charter services to abroad. Some of them have been authorised to perform 
internal services since 1996. '^* In the context of bilateral agreements today Turkish 
Airlines operate scheduled services towards more than one hundred points abroad. 
On the other hand, more than sixty foreign airlines companies are engaged in 
scheduled services and over one hundred operate non-scheduled services to Turkey. 
Even these approximate numbers set up sufficient evidence that today Turkey is
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included in the international network of air traffic and transportation that can be 
considered as the opposite of the state of isolationism.
In general, all these aspects which continue to exist since the Chicago 
Convention prove that today Turkey has a certain place in the complex network of 
international air traffic and transportation and that this situation which gradually 
occurred after the Chicago Convention is very different than Turkey’s inefficient 
engagement in civil aviation worldwide in the first half of the 20*^ ’ century. Before 
the Chicago Convention although there had been some motives from time to time 
towards being involved in international air traffic in that period those had not been 
able to overcome the general isolated situation of Turkey. On one side, there had 
been a newly established aviation industry in the country with insufficient financial 
resources which was living its infant years. Therefore it was impossible for that 
industry to transfer itself in international area in a short time. In other words 
activities on aviation had inevitably remained rather local in that period.
On the other side, a factor causing the isolated situation of Turkey had been 
that as a newly established country, in international politics Turkey before the 
Second World War had still been confronted by many diplomatic problems including 
land territory or airspace. The experience of the First World War and the Treaty of 
Sèvres which had been tried to be imposed upon Turkey had created a view that 
international arrangements which might implicitly or explicitly pose danger to the 
security of the country had to be prevented soon. In this respect it had been thought 
that a broad permission for outside powers to operate international air services to 
Turkey could bring about secret monitoring of the country in the near future. Turkey 
had been still forced to accept arrangements in favour of the outside powers in
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international negotiations. The Lausanne Convention had not solved all the existing 
disagreements and problems. Negotiations in Montreux had been a stage for a 
struggle between Turkey and other states to have more influence in the airspace over 
the Turkish Straits. All the existing situation which is an indication of an extremely 
fragile international security environment for Turkey had forced the country to 
follow a policy based on the classical understanding of sovereignty. Namely foreign 
powers had to be kept away from the country as much as possible. Thus in the 
context of such a policy the inclusion of those powers in air traffic over Turkey had 
been perceived as perilous.
Despite this general point of view some special permission to operate air 
services over Turkey had been granted to particular foreign airline companies. 
However their implementation had mostly failed or continued for a very short time. 
The reasons had been again related with the protection of the newly established 
aviation industry, security concerns of Turkey and diplomatic events in the world 
that had made Turkey to reconsider those permissions to foreigners for her interests. 
Therefore the isolationist attitude of Turkey in the first half of the 20**^ century had 
stemmed from factors which were valid for that period. The strict protection of the 
newly born internal aviation industry, the safeguarding of the country, the 
experiences of the former imposition of the Sèvres Treaty which then had led Turkey 
to follow a very classical jealous and cautious policy in terms of sovereignty and 
international events which had made a very fragile security environment together had 
made Turkey to prefer a kind isolationism concerning international civil aviation 
which could at least guarantee to keep foreign elements away from the country.
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Turkey’s policy in favor of being isolated from international civil aviation 
before the Chicago Convention can also be explained in terms of the fact that in that 
period the concept of international civil aviation had not yet reached the level of a 
huge industry throughout the world as it reached after the Chicago Convention until 
recently. It had succeeded to become worthwhile to be dealt with in 1920s as it could 
be seen in the conclusion of the Warsaw Convention to establish certain standards. 
However there had still been an uncertainty regarding the future of international civil 
aviation because of the tensions occurring in international relations. As in Turkey, in 
fact the civil aviation industry had still been in its initial phase throughout the world. 
In other words as it was a gradually continuing process and not an overnight 
development, there was a time and an opportunity for Turkey to make necessary 
calculations concerning being involved in international civil aviation or not. In any 
way in that period Turkey’s preference had been rather to remain isolated.
Consequently, when the international regime on civil aviation which was 
founded after the Second World War and its signalling the end of the isolationist 
policy of Turkey are analysed overall in the theoretical context of international 
relations, mainly two opposite approaches come to stage. The first one, the realist 
approach, emphasises the rational calculations of states in line with their interests in 
the creation of an aviation regime. The second approach which is closer to pluralism 
or idealism in a sense, develops another theory that the formation of such a regime 
came to being not only as a result of sole national interests, but also cooperation of 
states based on stronger and deeper sources as shared values, collective goods.
knowledge, perceptions or beliefs.75
75
The first one, realism, foresees an international atmosphere of an anarchical 
nature based on competing interests of modern unitary states which are accepted as 
rational actors in the international system. Those rational actors all try to advance 
their national interests on the basis of their power. Thus the creation of international 
regimes are merely national interest-motivated based on relative gains in stead of 
absolute gains for all and far from being sincere idealistic cooperation efforts. 
Cooperative arrangements in issues such as economics, trade or environment where 
states are interdependent, are imposed by the dominant powers and by this way 
international stability might be maintained. Realism has a cautious and reserved 
approach against the state of interdependence. It might, but not necessarily, enhance 
cooperation and stability.
Within this framework, according to the theory of hegemonic stability, the 
dominant power called as the hegemon assumes leadership, perhaps for the entire 
globe, in various issue areas and international air transport is one of those areas. At 
best while the hegemonic state or states benefit, other less powerful states also 
benefit from that stable environment. By contrast, the decline of the hegemony 
produces disorder. So all the members of the regime are in favour of its continuation 
and the stability maintained by the dominant state or states because they have no 
other way to choose.^*"
Thus the regime for international aviation founded after the Second World 
War is an illustration of this situation according to realists. The origins of post-war 
aviation regulation stem from the efforts by the US and Britain to pursue their 
respective national interests in aviation markets.^^ Despite the fact that it was built on 
the interests of those two leading powers in aviation, as a result a huge network of
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global air transportation and traffic took place and nearly all states, including Turkey, 
benefited. Aviation went into an order and international air services were established 
on certain principles and rules.
In this regard, Turkey’s policy of active involvement can also be connected 
with the matter of relative gains. According to the realist theory, since states are 
rational actors, their action in the case of regimes is basically driven by the 
calculations of relative gains and losses. When it was realised by Turkey that the 
exclusion of her airspace from international air traffic was paving the way for the 
strengthening of Greece and Egypt as significant points in international air traffic and 
when it became clear that this would deprive her of potential advantages which can 
be taken from being included in international air traffic, the isolationist policy was 
left out and Turkey participated in the global air regime.
In short, the realist approach sees the international aviation regime as 
instrumental under the control of the dominant powers rather than an ideal situation.
The second approach contains elements of pluralism in such a way that it 
gives more importance to a number of economic, social and technical issues and the 
growth of interdependence among states and societies in the modern time. In 
addition it sees interdependence as positive, an opportunity for building good 
relations among states. Managing interdependent relations may bring about 
cooperation, construction of rules and procedures and finally certain international 
regimes. These rules are voluntarily established by states to provide some degree of 
order in international relations.**  ^ Thus in contrast to realism, the regime on 
international aviation is recognised as it has been wished by all states rather than 
being a mere imposition of the hegemon. Cooperation does not only stem from
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strategie calculation or rational interest-motivated action but also from shared values, 
beliefs, historical experiences in international collaboration and developing science 
and technology which gradually create some areas of common goals. In this respect, 
international air transportation and services reached to such a level that inevitably 
there became a necessity to build an order. The objective in establishing regimes is 
making absolute gains rather than strict relative gains. In other words, international 
regimes arise from the need of states to reach certain joint gains. This approach 
foresees a willingness to set aside narrow national interests in favour of a broader 
conception of common goods .Thus  the foundation of the post-war air transport 
regime was beyond narrow interests of the dominant powers and as an evidence, this 
approach indicates that the national interests of those powers could never be 
materialised in whole sense. Many concessions were given and compromises were 
reached. Thus it became an arrangement for the collective good of states, including 
Turkey, in terms of international civil aviation rather than a mere illustration of 
hegemonic power.
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 ^ The fact that they are intertwined with each other is also reflected in the context of 
the main international organisation on civil aviation that is the ICAO. International 
air navigation and transportation are considered to be on equal footing among the 
aims and objectives of that organisation. For aims and objectives of ICAO, see 
Jacques Naveau, International Air Transport in a Changing World (Bruylant: 
Martinus NijhofPublishers, 1989) 51-52.
 ^ The regarding Convention is considered as a major landmark in the history of 
international civil aviation and will be explained in detail in Chapter IV of this study. 
See pages 42-51.
 ^ Oran Young and Gail Osherenko,
Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 1.
Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources 
and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) 11.
 ^ Some other subject areas of different international regimes are proliferation (the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime), international commerce or monetary issues (the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade System and the Bretton Woods System) 
and human rights (the Helsinki Accords). For more detail on the types and features of 
international regimes, see Young and Osherenko, 1-22 and Young, 1-81.
 ^ The Warsaw Convention is also a major step through the development of 
international civil aviation which established a certain criteria in technical sphere that 
is also valid today. The main aspects of the Convention take place in Chapter V of 
this study. For a more detailed information on the Warsaw Convention, see I.H.Ph. 
Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997) 57-107.
 ^ A detailed explanation on the legal status of airspace is provided in Ömer İlhan 
Akipek, Hava Sahasının Devletler Hukuku Bakımından Durumu (A.Ü. Hukuk 
Fakültesi Yayınları, 1959)
* For Paris Convention of 1919 Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, see 
Diederiks-Verschoor, 4-6. Also see Akipek, 55-68.
 ^ The regarding Paris Convention lost its validity with the entry into force of the 
Chicago Convention in 1944. Akipek, 67.
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10 About Turkey’s policy towards international civil aviation the term ’’isolationism” 
was first used by Mazhar Nedim Göknil together with the Turkish equivalent 
“infiratçılık”. See Mazhar Nedim Göknil, Hava Hukuku (İstanbul; İ.T.Ü. Yayınları, 
1951) 41.
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NOTES FOR CFIAPTER II
11
12
Akipek, 18-41.
The legal term “Res Communis” as adopted from the Roman Law means a thing 
that belongs to everybody and cannot be the property of an individual. The view 
supporting the freedom of airspace cites that airspace should be open for use by 
everybody and nobody should establish an exclusive and strict domination over the 
whole or part of airspace.
Akipek, 21.
14 Goknil, 41-47.
Akipek, 41-118 
Diederiks-Verschoor, 4
17
18
19
Diederiks-Verschoor, 4-5 
See page 42-51.
Those agreements were International Air Services Transit Agreement that 
contained two of those freedoms and International Air Transport Agreement that 
contained three more freedom in addition to the first two. For those agreements, see 
Naveau, 29-31.
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20 For the histoiy of aviation in Turkey before the Treaty of Sèvres, refer to Tahir 
Çağa. Hava Hukuku (Istanbul; İ.Ü. Yayınları No: 996, 1963) 51-55.
See Cemil Bilsel, Milletlerarası Hava Hukuku (Istanbul: İ.T.Ü. Yayınları No: 
383, 1948) 53-54.
22 See Akipek, 66.
Apart from Turkey states such as the United States, Soviet Union and Germany 
were also outside the Convention. For the list of states party to the Paris Convention 
of 1919, see Akipek, 67.
Bilsel, 54-55.
It was foreseen by the Article 4 of the Convention. Bilsel, 55.
All kinds of aircrafts that are non-military are included in the context of 
commercial aircrafts. Bilsel, 54.
Bilsel, 54.
Bilsel, 55
Bilsel, 55,56
For a detailed information on the negotiations made in Montreux, refer to Bilsel, 
56-70.
”  Bilsel, 69.
Diederiks-Verschoor, 4 and Göknil, 46.
Diederiks-Verschoor, 5.
Diederiks-Verschoor, 4-5.
Diederiks-Verschoor, 4-5.
Göknil, 46.
Diederiks-Vershoor, 131-132. Also see Çağa, 62.
82
'^^Akipek, 102.
The name C.I.N.A. which is used more common comes from French, Comité 
International Technique d’Experts Juridiques Aériens. Diederiks-Verschoor, 4.
42 Akipek, 59-60.
43 Bilsel, 87-89.
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44
45
46
Bilsel, 85. 
Naveau, 26-27.
Naveau, 27.
Naveau, 31-33.
Seabrooke, 109.
For the complete list of the technical annexes see, Diederiks-Verschoor 6-7. 
Seabrooke, 110.
Diederiks-Verschoor, 15.
53‘ The concept of cabotage as it was adopted in the Chicago Convention faces many 
critiques at the same time on the basis that it constitutes an obstacle to free aviation. 
Especially supporters of the liberal view claim that the limitations caused by 
cabotage against foreign states and foreign airline companies hinder the long-term 
development of international aviation in general. Diederiks-Verschoor, 19.
Bilsel, 123.
See the establishment of ICAO in Naveau, 51-58.
Bilateral agreements had also taken place in the era after the Paris Convention of 
October 13, 1919. In fact the Convention had foreseen bilateral agreements as the 
only way of establishing great amount of commercial air services between states. 
Diederiks-Verschoor, 51-54.
57
58
Naveau, 36.
Naveau, 37, 38.
See Bin Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (New York: Oceana 
Publications, 1962) 562-565. Also see Seabrooke, 115-116.
Bin Cheng, 565.
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See Mesut Önen, Türk Sivil Havacılık Mevzuatı ve Uluslararası Uzay Hukuku 
Kuralları (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1986) 585-596.
62 The list of the countries with which Turkey has concluded bilateral air services 
agreements takes place in the web site; www.ubak.gov.tr
See Marek Zylicz, International air Transport Law (London: Martinus Nijhof 
Publishers, 1992) 89.
Seabrooke, 104.
Diederiks-Versehoor, 18 and Zylicz, 116.
Since the establishment of ICAO was incorporated in the Chicago Convention, 
Turkey after adopting the Convention automatically became a member of ICAO. For 
a detailed information on the adoption process of the Chicago Convention by Turkey, 
seeBilsel, 115-132.
67 Naveau, 50.
Under the provisions of most of the bilateral agreements taking Bermuda 
Agreement as model, parties agree that fares and rates must be discussed and 
determined by the designated carriers preferably through the machinery provided by 
I AT A. Naveau, 61-65.
69 Naveau, 62.
Naveau, 64-65.
Diederiks-Verschoor, 45 and Naveau 68-78. 
Diederiks-Verschoor, 46 and Zylicz, 119-121. 
Diederiks-Verschoor, 49-50.
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74 Those airline companies are Istanbul Airlines and Onur Air.
See, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi,
International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism. Globalism 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993) 243-245 and 
Baldev Raj Nayar, “Regimes, Power and International Aviation”
International Organisation Vol:49 Winter 1995, 139-170
The theories on regimes which assume the role of the hegemonic power are also 
called as “power-based-theories”. See, Young and Osherenko, 9
John E. Richards, “Regulating International Aviation Markets”
International Organisation. Vol:53, Winter 1999, 7
Nayar, 141
79,80 Viotti and Kauppi, 229
Volker Ritterberger, Regime Theory and International Relations 
(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1993) 223-252
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